De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Election Law, Voting Rights and Other Constitutional Cases by Morley, Michael T.
Florida State University College of Law 
Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Publications 
Spring 2016 
De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions in Election Law, Voting Rights and Other Constitutional 
Cases 
Michael T. Morley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles 
 Part of the Construction Law Commons, and the Election Law Commons 
 
DE FACTO CLASS ACTIONS? PLAINTIFF- AND 
DEFENDANT-ORIENTED INJUNCTIONS IN  
VOTING RIGHTS, ELECTION LAW, AND  
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
MICHAEL T. MORLEY* 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 488 
I.  INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN ELECTION LAW CASES ..... 497 
A.  Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions ...................................................... 500 
B.  Current Approaches...................................... 503 
1.  Presumptive Issuance of Defendant-
Oriented Injunctions ............................... 504 
2.  Mandatory Issuance of  
Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions ............... 510 
3.  Intermediate or Compromise 
Approaches .............................................. 514 
C.  Theoretical Tensions Underlying  
the Dispute ..................................................... 516 
II.  THE PROBLEMS WITH DEFENDANT-ORIENTED 
INJUNCTIONS ......................................................... 521 
A.  Standing .......................................................... 523 
B.  Due Process and Other Rightholders ......... 527 
C.  Asymmetric Preclusion ................................ 531 
D.  The Law of Judgments and Rule 23 ............ 534 
E.  Geographic Limitations of Lower Courts .. 535 
III. SOME POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS .............................. 538 
A.  Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions .......................... 540 
B.  Organizational Standing .............................. 544 
                                                                                                        
 * Assistant Professor, Barry University School of Law; Climenko Fellow and 
Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, 2012–14. J.D., Yale Law School, 2003; A.B., 
magna cum laude, Princeton University, 2000. I am deeply grateful for the extreme-
ly helpful feedback I received from Maureen Carroll, Erwin Chemerinsky, Au-
tumn Morley, and Doug Rendleman. I also appreciate the questions, comments, 
and suggestions I received from Daniel Birk, Joshua A. Douglas, Russell Gold, 
Rebecca Green, Caprice Roberts, Jamelle Sharpe, and Nicholas Stephanopoulos, as 
well as the participants at the Junior Federal Courts Conference at the University 
of California, Irvine School of Law and election law conferences at the Washburn 
University School of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, and University 
of Mississippi School of Law. Finally, I could not have completed this article 
without the invaluable research assistance of Briana Halpin, and the editorial 
assistance of Erin Cady and the staff of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. 
488 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 39 
C.  Unity of Forum Proposals ............................ 546 
D.  Equal Protection Approach .......................... 548 
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ......... 549 
A.  Choosing Between Plaintiff- and  
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions ................. 550 
B.  Determining the Proper Scope of  
Relief at the Outset of the Case .................... 553 
V.  CONCLUSION ......................................................... 556 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Litigation challenging the validity of statutes and regulations 
governing the electoral process has become a staple of nearly 
every federal election cycle.1 Democratic Presidential candidate 
Hillary Clinton’s barrage of constitutional and other challenges 
to various state laws governing the electoral process, com-
mencing over a year-and-a-half before the 2016 presidential 
election,2 is merely the latest front in the ongoing Voting Wars.3 
Left-wing partisans routinely challenge measures such as voter 
identification laws4 and reductions in early voting periods.5 
Right-wing litigants, for their part, have primarily challenged 
                                                                                                        
 1. See Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote Under Sec-
tion 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 279, 280–81 (identifying 
various types of recent lawsuits). 
 2. Maggie Haberman & Amy Chozick, Democrats Wage a National Fight Over 
Voter Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/ 
us/politics/democrats-voter-rights-lawsuit-hillary-clinton.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/X99H-TSVH]. 
 3. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS 4 (2012). 
 4. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Frank v. 
Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 844–63 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015); Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. 
Tex. 2014), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 
F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 5. See, e.g., Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 531, 
545–49 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014); Obama for 
Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 428–36 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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campaign finance restrictions6 and federal limits on state sover-
eignty such as the Voting Rights Act.7 
When a plaintiff successfully challenges an election law or 
regulation as violating the U.S. Constitution, an applicable state 
constitution,8 the Voting Rights Act or some other federal stat-
ute (for state legal provisions), or an agency’s organic statute or 
law such as the Administrative Procedure Act9 (for regula-
tions), the district court must decide numerous issues in de-
termining the proper relief. For example, in constitutional cas-
es, the court must decide whether the challenged provision is 
facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional only as applied to 
litigants in the plaintiff’s position.10 The court also must de-
termine whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy11 and, 
if so, how broadly it should be crafted. In particular, the court 
must determine whether the injunction should grant relief sole-
                                                                                                        
 6. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 7. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amend-
ed in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.); see Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 
(2013); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203–04 (2009). 
 8. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 89, 101–05 (2014) (arguing that state constitutions typically protect 
the right to vote to a greater extent than the federal Constitution). But see Michael 
T. Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
EN BANC 189, 191–92 (2014) [hereinafter Morley, State Constitutions] (arguing that 
the test that the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted for determining whether the 
right to vote under the U.S. Constitution has been violated is substantially similar 
to the standards that most state supreme courts have long applied when interpret-
ing their respective state constitutions). 
 9. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 10. Several commentators have offered valuable insight into the proper way for 
courts to approach this issue. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State 
and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 249–51 (1994) (arguing that, if a legal 
provision violates certain constitutional principles, it must be deemed facially 
invalid); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party 
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1348–51 (2000); see also Matthew D. Adler, Rights 
Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
1 (1998). I plan to focus on this subject in future work. 
 11. Even in constitutional cases, courts must confirm that a plaintiff has stand-
ing to seek injunctive relief, see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 
(1983), and often at least go through the motions of applying the four-factor 
standard set forth in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), for de-
termining whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy. See Michael T. Morley, 
Enforcing Equality: Statutory Injunctions, Equitable Balancing Under eBay, and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 188–90 [hereinafter Morley, 
Statutory Injunctions]. 
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ly in favor of the plaintiffs in the case (“Plaintiff-Oriented In-
junction”), or instead enjoin the defendant officials or agencies 
(“government defendants”) from enforcing or implementing 
the challenged provision against anyone in the state or even the 
nation, as appropriate (“Defendant-Oriented Injunction”).12 
A Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction precludes the government 
defendants from enforcing the challenged provision against the 
successful plaintiffs in the case, while leaving them free to en-
force the provision against other members of the public. Such 
an order is generally sufficient to resolve the case or contro-
versy before the court and vindicate the plaintiffs’ rights, with-
out adjudicating or enforcing the rights of third parties not be-
fore the court that the plaintiffs lack standing to assert. Because 
non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel generally does not lie 
against the government,13 the government defendants remain 
free to defend the provision’s validity in subsequent cases, in 
which other courts may uphold the provision. The limited 
scope of Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions also ensures that the ef-
fects of a trial or intermediate appellate court’s ruling do not 
extend beyond the scope of its territorial jurisdiction, to parts of 
the state or nation where its opinions lack the force of law. 
A Defendant-Oriented Injunction, in contrast, allows a single 
judge to completely enjoin enforcement of a state or federal le-
gal provision throughout the state or nation, respectively. It 
prevents the unfairness that could result from enforcing certain 
plaintiffs’ rights while allowing the challenged provision to 
otherwise remain in effect, violating the rights of others. A De-
fendant-Oriented Injunction effectively transforms an individ-
ual-plaintiff lawsuit into a de facto class action, without satis-
fying the requirements of Rule 23 or giving the injunction’s 
                                                                                                        
 12. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702–03 (1979) (recognizing the power 
of district courts to grant nationwide injunctions). Both Plaintiff-Oriented and 
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions, of course, almost always are directed exclusively 
toward the defendants, requiring them to take, or prohibiting them from taking, 
certain acts. A Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction is one which restricts the defendants’ 
behavior solely toward the particular plaintiffs in the case. A Defendant-Oriented 
Injunction, in contrast, enjoins the defendants from applying an invalid legal pro-
vision, or taking some other improper action, with regard to anyone. 
 13. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158–62 (1984). 
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purported beneficiaries notice of the suit or an opportunity to 
opt out.14 
These categories are not entirely distinct. In certain cases, it 
would be impossible to fully enforce a plaintiff’s rights without 
completely invalidating a statute or regulation as it applies to 
everyone. Unconstitutional or otherwise improper redistricting 
presents perhaps the most obvious example of this concept in 
the election law context. A state cannot have one set of con-
gressional or legislative districts for individual plaintiffs in a 
case and a different set for everyone else.15 And “[e]ven if indi-
vidual relief might satisfy [a] plaintiff’s claim, it [may] be eco-
nomically impractical to create a special remedy just for the 
single victorious plaintiff.”16 Across the broad run of cases, 
however, it often will be possible to grant meaningful relief to 
individual plaintiffs without necessarily extending it to every-
one else.17 In the parlance of the American Law Institute’s Prin-
ciples of Aggregate Litigation, it is typically possible for courts in 
                                                                                                        
 14. This Article uses the phrases “individual-plaintiff case” and “individual-
plaintiff lawsuit” to refer to any non-class case brought by one or more individual, 
non-organizational plaintiffs, or entities asserting associational standing to en-
force the rights of their members on their behalf, see infra notes 278–79 and ac-
companying text. When an organization instead contends that applying the chal-
lenged legal provision to any member of the public would harm the 
organization’s own institutional interests, see infra notes 280–86 and accompany-
ing text, the case is best conceptualized as an “organizational” lawsuit, which 
implicates unique issues, rather than an individual-plaintiff case. See infra Part 
III.B. 
 15. See McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]n re-
apportionment and school desegregation cases, for example, it is not possible to 
award effective relief to the plaintiffs without altering the rights of third parties.”); 
see also Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1963) (entering Defendant-
Oriented Injunction, prohibiting defendants from engaging in any segregation, to 
enforce plaintiffs’ right to desegregated transportation facilities); Brandon L. Gar-
rett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 632 (2012) 
(citing school desegregation example); Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action 
Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 648 (2015) (offering 
other examples). Lisa Marshall Manheim has identified several ways in which 
redistricting litigation may fail to protect the interests of non-litigants (that is, the 
general public), who are unavoidably affected by those rulings. Lisa Marshall 
Manheim, Redistricting Litigation and the Delegation of Democratic Design, 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 563, 599–603 (2013). 
 16. Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class 
Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 364 (1988). 
 17. Williams, supra note 15, at 650 (“[I]t will often be possible for courts to craft a 
narrower equitable remedy that affords complete relief to the particular plaintiff 
or plaintiffs appearing before it that would not affect the defendant’s obligations 
with respect to other similarly situated individuals.”). 
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election law, voting rights, and other constitutional cases to 
award “divisible,” plaintiff-specific relief, rather than “indi-
visible,” across-the-board relief.18 The question is whether, and 
when, they may (or should, or must) do so. 
The choice between a Plaintiff- or Defendant-Oriented In-
junction assumes particular importance in election law cases 
because these cases tend to be brought on behalf of individual 
plaintiffs, or sometimes associational plaintiffs (which impli-
cate unique standing problems19), rather than as class actions.20 
The goal of most such plaintiffs is not simply to enforce their 
own rights, but rather to change the underlying rules by which 
the campaign or election as a whole will be conducted. Like-
wise, as discussed at greater length below, the issue assumes 
primary importance for cases at the trial and intermediate ap-
pellate levels, where the court’s written opinion concerning the 
validity of the challenged provision will not definitively re-
solve the issue across the entire state or nation as a matter of 
stare decisis.21 
Courts have adopted inconsistent approaches to determining 
whether to issue Plaintiff- or Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in 
non-class cases.22 Indeed, many courts either fail to recognize 
that they have a choice in the matter, or overlook most of the 
critical issues that the decision between a Plaintiff-Oriented In-
junction and Defendant-Oriented Injunction implicates. Com-
mentators have begun to recognize the importance of this is-
                                                                                                        
 18. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04(a)–(b) (2010). The 
comments to the Principles muddy the waters, stating that a lawsuit challenging “a 
generally applicable policy or practice maintained by a defendant” requires “in-
divisible remedies.” Id. § 2.04 cmt. a. This statement is inaccurately overbroad, 
however. Even if a law is facially unconstitutional, it often will be possible for a 
trial or appellate court to enjoin its enforcement solely against individual plaintiffs 
in a case, rather than completely. See Williams, supra note 15, at 650. 
 19. See infra Part III.B. 
 20. See Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common 
Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2035 (2015); Garrett, supra 
note 15, at 594; cf. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes 
Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 
1648 & n.118 (1997) (citing several important civil rights cases which were litigat-
ed as individual suits, rather than class actions). 
 21. See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra Part I.B. 
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sue, but have yet to reach a consensus, and have never ex-
amined it specifically in the unique context of election law.23 
This Article contends that the traditional rules governing lit-
igation and the scope of judgments apply equally to consti-
tutional cases, including election law and voting rights cases. 
Courts should be attentive to such principles to avoid inad-
vertently or inappropriately providing “overrelief” to plaintiffs 
in non-class cases, particularly in ways that violate courts’ ju-
risdictional limits or infringe the rights of third parties. While 
the insights offered in this Article apply to all fields of consti-
tutional and administrative law, this Article will focus primar-
ily on election law and voting rights because those fields are 
permeated by the deep interplay between individual and col-
                                                                                                        
 23. Some have advocated caution in the use of Defendant-Oriented Injunctions. 
See Michelle R. Slack, Separation of Powers and Second Opinions: Protecting the Gov-
ernment’s Role in Developing the Law by Limiting Nationwide Class Actions Against the 
Federal Government, 31 REV. LITIG. 943, 968–71 (2012) (arguing that Defendant-
Oriented Injunctions interfere with interbranch dialogue and prevent an issue 
from percolating through the lower courts); Daniel J. Walker, Note, Administrative 
Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of Non-Class Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
1119, 1123–24, 1145–49 (2005) (arguing that courts should decide whether to issue 
Plaintiff- or Defendant-Oriented Injunctions on a case-by-case basis, depending 
on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the rights at issue). 
 Others have urged more widespread use of Rule 23(b)(2) classes to facilitate the 
issuance of broad injunctions while avoiding many of the concerns raised by this 
Article. See Carroll, supra note 20, at 2075–76 (arguing that rules should be re-
formed to facilitate certification of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, rather than encour-
aging courts to continue issuing Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in non-class cas-
es); Garrett, supra note 15, at 643–48 (arguing that both substantive constitutional 
decision rules and procedural rules should be changed to facilitate class-action-
based constitutional challenges); Daniel Tenny, Note, There is Always a Need: The 
“Necessity Doctrine” and Class Certification Against Government Agencies, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 1018, 1019 (2005) (criticizing the “necessity doctrine,” under which courts 
decline to certify classes under Rule 23(b)(2) on the grounds that government 
officials can be trusted to implement their rulings, because class certification is 
necessary to ensure that favorable court rulings are applied to all similarly situat-
ed people); Timothy Wilton, The Class Action in Social Reform Litigation: In Whose 
Interest?, 63 B.U. L. REV. 597, 597–600 (1983) (arguing that, because courts have 
broad discretion to issue Defendant-Oriented Injunctions, it is in government 
defendants’ interests for social reform litigation to proceed via class action rather 
than individual suits, to allow those defendants to invoke res judicata against 
subsequent claims if they prevail). Mark C. Weber advocates the use of Rule 
23(b)(2) when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief that will benefit many others, but 
argues that class members should not be bound by res judicata unless they were 
given notice and an opportunity to opt out. Weber, supra note 16, at 400–01; cf. 
Williams, supra note 15, at 651–53 (arguing that class members who oppose in-
junctive relief should be permitted to opt out of Rule 23(b)(2) classes). 
494 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 39 
lective rights that the choice between Plaintiff- and Defendant-
Oriented Injunctions reflects. 
Part I of this Article reviews the different approaches that 
courts have adopted in deciding whether to issue Plaintiff- or 
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in “individual-plaintiff” or 
non-class cases, and the rationales underlying those ap-
proaches. This Part also examines the overarching theoretical 
tensions that give rise to these conflicting approaches. 
Part II identifies the various concerns that Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions raise. Because a plaintiff’s rights generally can be ful-
ly enforced through a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction, individual 
plaintiffs lack Article III standing to seek broader relief in the 
form of Defendant-Oriented Injunctions. A Defendant-Oriented 
Injunction effectively allows a plaintiff to assert, and a court to 
enforce, the rights of third parties over whom the court never 
acquired personal jurisdiction. Some of those people inevitably 
will be outside of the court’s geographic jurisdiction, and may 
very well support the enjoined provision or not wish to assert or 
enforce their purported rights.  
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions also raise fairness concerns 
due to asymmetric claim preclusion. If courts may award De-
fendant-Oriented Injunctions in non-class, individual-plaintiff 
cases, then when a plaintiff in such a case prevails, all 
rightholders throughout the state or nation stand to have their 
rights enforced by the judgment. If the plaintiff loses, however, 
other rightholders are not bound by res judicata or collateral 
estoppel; the court’s ruling does not prevent them from bring-
ing their own challenges to the legal provision at issue, either 
in the same court or different courts. Fundamental fairness 
counsels against a doctrine that allows third parties to have 
their rights vindicated by a favorable ruling, without having 
those rights be deemed adjudicated by an adverse ruling. 
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions also are in tension with the 
policies of Rule 23, which dictate that classwide relief should be 
available only if the requirements set forth in the rule are satis-
fied. Finally, such injunctions allow trial and intermediate ap-
pellate courts to give their rulings the force of law outside their 
respective geographic jurisdictions.  
Part III discusses some potential ways of avoiding both the 
limitations of Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions and the challenges 
posed by Defendant-Oriented Injunctions. This Part considers 
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Rule 23(b)(2) class actions,24 lawsuits brought by associational 
plaintiffs, specialized courts, and stricter application of Equal 
Protection principles. As this Part demonstrates, none of these 
alternatives are fully satisfactory.   
Part IV offers an alternate approach. This Part begins by pro-
posing a two-prong test for determining whether a Plaintiff- or 
a Defendant-Oriented Injunction is the proper remedy in a 
non-class, individual-plaintiff lawsuit to enjoin a legal provi-
sion. First, the court should assess whether granting the re-
quested relief solely to the individual plaintiffs would create 
unconstitutional disparities concerning fundamental rights in 
violation of Equal Protection principles. As discussed in Part 
III.D, this seldom, if ever, should be the case, but commentators 
or courts reasonably may take a different view of this issue. 
Indeed, even if a court disagrees with this Article’s recom-
mended approach to the Equal Protection component of the 
analysis, it still may apply this Article’s recommended frame-
work for determining the proper scope of relief when a legal 
provision is challenged. 
Second, if limiting relief solely to the individual plaintiffs 
would be constitutional, the court should then determine 
whether a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction would be proper under 
the challenged statute or regulation itself. The court should 
treat this issue as a question of severability. In a traditional 
severability analysis, a court will sever an invalid provision 
from the rest of an enactment, allowing the remainder to con-
tinue in effect, if: (i) the remaining provisions can operate co-
herently as a law, and (ii) the court concludes that the enacting 
entity would have intended for those remaining provisions to 
be enforced even without the invalidated portion of the law.25 
A court should apply the same approach in determining 
whether a challenged legal provision may be enjoined only 
with regard to the particular plaintiffs in a case, or instead 
must be invalidated in toto. If the challenged provision can co-
                                                                                                        
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is 
satisfied and if . . . the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole . . . .”). 
 25. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 (2012); 
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1987); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (citing Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 
U.S. 210, 234 (1932)). 
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herently be applied just to people other than the plaintiffs, and 
the entity that enacted the provision would have wanted to 
“save” as much of it as possible (that is, have it enforced, even 
though certain people must be excluded from its scope), then a 
Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction would be the proper remedy. If, in 
contrast, the court determines that the entity that enacted the 
legal provision would not have wanted to have two conflicting 
sets of rules applied concurrently to different segments of the 
public, or that it would be impossible to do so, then a Defend-
ant-Oriented Injunction would be required. 
Part IV goes on to suggest that the trial court should conduct 
this analysis at the outset  of any non-class, individual-plaintiff 
case in which the plaintiffs seek to enjoin an allegedly invalid 
legal provision.26 If the court concludes that a Defendant-Ori-
ented Injunction would be the required remedy if the plaintiffs 
prevail, then it should hold that indispensable parties are miss-
ing from the case (that is, the non-party beneficiaries of a De-
fendant-Oriented Injunction),27 and require the plaintiffs to re-
file the suit as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. Conversely, if neither 
the Constitution nor the challenged legal provision would re-
quire the court to issue a Defendant-Oriented Injunction should 
the plaintiffs succeed, then the court should allow the case to 
proceed on a non-class basis. If the plaintiffs prevail, they would 
be eligible to receive only a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction. This 
Article’s suggestions are independent of each other: a court 
could adopt the proposed two-prong test for determining the 
proper breadth of relief while declining to conduct this analysis 
at the outset of a case. Addressing those issues at the outset, 
however, allows a court to avoid the standing and asymmetric 
preclusion concerns discussed in Part II by requiring that suits in 
which Defendant-Oriented Injunctions would be necessary are 
brought as Rule 23(b)(2) class actions. 
Part IV concludes by offering some important caveats to 
these recommendations. Because Rule 23(b)(2) class actions do 
                                                                                                        
 26. As a matter of judicial economy, the court might have discretion to simply 
dismiss a case without performing this analysis if it determines that the plaintiffs’ 
claims are squarely foreclosed by binding precedent as a matter of law. Cf. 
Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 455–56 (2015). 
 27. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(A) (“A person who is subject to service of process 
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must 
be joined as a party if . . . in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord com-
plete relief among existing parties . . . .”). 
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not guarantee class members either notice or an opportunity to 
be heard prior to class certification, res judicata should apply 
less stringently than usual in any subsequent challenges to the 
same legal provisions. Class members should be barred from 
relitigating only specific issues and arguments actually raised 
on their behalf, rather than all issues and arguments that could 
have been raised in the initial suit, such as alternate constitu-
tional challenges to the legal provision at issue.28 
Moreover, to prevent courts of limited geographic jurisdic-
tion from unilaterally dictating law to the entire nation, any 
certified class should be limited geographically. This Article 
recommends that the class be limited to rightholders within the 
geographical boundaries of the intermediate appellate court in 
which the trial court sits. For a case filed in the U.S. District 
Court for the Middle District of Florida, for example, the class 
would include all rightholders within the Eleventh Circuit. A 
stricter alternative would be to limit the class solely to 
rightholders within the trial court’s geographic jurisdiction. 
Part V briefly concludes. At a minimum, this Article seeks to 
bring greater attention to the often-overlooked choice between 
Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions. More ambi-
tiously, it proposes a new framework to help courts make re-
medial decisions in a more consistent and predictable manner. 
Applying this framework also will help courts recognize and 
address the wide range of jurisdictional limits, constitutional 
and statutory restrictions, and policy considerations that their 
remedial decisions implicate. 
I. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN ELECTION LAW CASES 
A court may determine that a legal provision is invalid for 
any number of reasons. Most basically, it may conclude that the 
provision violates the U.S. Constitution or a state constitution, 
either facially or as applied. A court may deem a state law in-
consistent with, or preempted by, federal law.29 Or else a court 
                                                                                                        
 28. Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“Under res judicata, a final 
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from 
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” (citing 
Cromwell v. Cty. of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876))). 
 29. Preemption is a special concern in the context of laws governing congres-
sional elections. The Elections Clause specifically grants Congress power to “make 
or alter” state laws concerning the “Times, Places and Manner” of such elections. 
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may invalidate a regulation for violating an agency’s organic 
statute or a framework law such as the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. Whenever a court determines that a statute or regu-
lation is invalid for any of these reasons, it must decide wheth-
er to enjoin enforcement of that provision, and how broadly 
any such injunction should be crafted.  
To determine whether to issue a permanent injunction, a fed-
eral court applies the four-factor test set forth in eBay 
v. MercExchange.30 eBay requires the court to assess whether the 
plaintiff has suffered irreparable injury and lacks an adequate 
remedy at law, the balance of hardships favors the plaintiff, 
and injunctive relief is in the public interest.31 Federal courts 
have periodically declined to issue injunctions to plaintiffs fac-
ing impending or ongoing constitutional violations due to their 
failure to satisfy one or more of these factors.32 Courts have de-
clined to grant injunctive relief in constitutional cases for a va-
riety of other reasons as well, including lack of standing,33 lach-
es,34 and the belief that injunctive relief was unnecessary 
because the court was confident government officials would 
enforce its ruling.35 
Once a court has decided that injunctive relief is an appro-
priate remedy, it must determine the proper scope of the in-
junction. One issue is whether the court should tailor its in-
junction to prohibit only conduct that it has ruled 
                                                                                                        
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Because of this unique preemption provision, the typi-
cal presumption against preemption does not apply when interpreting federal 
laws enacted under the Clause. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2247, 2256–57 (2013); see also Michael T. Morley, The New Elections Clause, 
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 79, 92 (2016). 
 30. 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006); see also Morley, Statutory Injunctions, supra note 
11, at 188–90 & n.74 (explaining that the eBay test has become the generally ac-
cepted standard for injunctive relief across numerous fields of law, including con-
stitutional law). I have argued elsewhere that injunctions afford the strongest 
available protection for a rightholder’s entitlements. Michael T. Morley, Public 
Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 2481–83 
(2014) [hereinafter Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral]. 
 31. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94. 
 32. Morley, Statutory Injunctions, supra note 11, at 188, 190, 205 (citing cases). 
 33. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 96, 108 (1983). 
 34. See, e.g., Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Comm., 849 F.2d 1176, 
1182 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he district court did not err in barring appellants’ equal 
protection claim for equitable relief on the ground of laches.”); see also Thatcher 
Enters. v. Cache Cty. Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 35. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). 
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unconstitutional, or instead enter a broader prophylactic in-
junction, to require or prohibit other conduct that may not ac-
tually be constitutionally required or proscribed.36 Courts in 
institutional reform cases often enter broad prophylactic in-
junctions to protect people’s rights more effectively.37 Despite 
their utility and widespread adoption in a variety of contexts,38 
the Supreme Court has voiced concern about broad prophylac-
tic injunctions on separation of powers and federalism 
grounds.39 Similarly, scholars have questioned the propriety of 
such relief,40 and Congress has pushed back against such 
measures in the prison reform context through the Prison Liti-
gation Reform Act.41 
Outside of institutional reform cases, when a litigant chal-
lenges the validity of a discrete legal provision, relief typically 
focuses on the disputed provision itself. The main question 
concerning the scope of injunctive relief in such cases is wheth-
er the injunction should focus on the plaintiffs or the de-
fendants. In other words, should the court enter a Plaintiff-Ori-
                                                                                                        
 36. See generally Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles 
and Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301 (2004) 
(defending prophylactic injunctions). 
 37. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685–88 (1978) (upholding injunction 
barring prison from imposing punitive solitary confinement on prisoners for 
longer than thirty days, even though the Court held that the practice did not nec-
essarily violate the Eighth Amendment); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22–31 (1971); OWEN FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 13 
(1978). 
 38. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordi-
nary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980) (discussing historical 
antecedents to broad institutional injunctions). 
 39. See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009) (noting that “institutional 
reform injunctions often raise sensitive federalism concerns” and can have “the 
effect of dictating state or local budget priorities”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 
385 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Article III cannot be understood to authorize 
the Federal Judiciary to take control of core state institutions like prisons, schools, 
and hospitals, and assume responsibility for making the difficult policy judg-
ments that state officials are both constitutionally entitled and uniquely qualified 
to make.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending 
Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 103–06 (1979); William A. 
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitima-
cy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 648–49 (1982); Morley, Statutory Injunctions, supra note 11, at 
218–21. 
 41. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 
Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1915, 1915A; 42 
U.S.C. § 1997 (2012)). 
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ented Injunction, tailored to prevent the plaintiffs’ rights from 
being violated by the invalid provision, or instead enter a De-
fendant-Oriented Injunction, prohibiting the defendant gov-
ernment entity or officials from enforcing the invalid provision 
altogether, against anyone? 
A deep and largely unrecognized circuit split exists con-
cerning the scope of relief a court should award when a plain-
tiff demonstrates that a legal provision is invalid in a non-class, 
individual-plaintiff case.42 Section A begins by exploring the 
distinction between Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunc-
tions in greater depth. Section B discusses the various ap-
proaches that courts have adopted in determining the proper 
scope of injunctive relief, while Section C examines the theo-
retical tensions that have contributed to courts’ confusion. 
A. Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions 
A court’s decision about whether to issue a Plaintiff- or De-
fendant-Oriented Injunction is, in many ways, as important as 
its underlying ruling on the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitu-
tional claim. A Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction vindicates the 
plaintiffs’ rights, but otherwise leaves the underlying statute or 
regulation undisturbed. In voting rights and election law cases, 
the rules governing the election remain unchanged as applied 
to everyone else. Because such cases often are not brought as 
class actions,43 Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions, by definition, ap-
ply narrowly, to only a few people. A Defendant-Oriented In-
junction, in contrast, allows a single judge of ostensibly limited 
territorial jurisdiction to completely prohibit the defendant 
agency or official from enforcing the challenged provision 
against anyone throughout the state or nation. 
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions turn non-class, individual-
plaintiff cases into modern analogues to “spurious” class ac-
tions, which had been permitted by the pre-1966 version of 
Rule 23.44 As one commentator explains, in a spurious class ac-
tion: 
[t]he named plaintiff could sue on behalf of the class and ob-
tain a decision in the class’s favor. Class members could then 
                                                                                                        
 42. See Carroll, supra note 20, at 2032. 
 43. See supra note 20. 
 44. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1963) (amended 1966). 
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opt in to get relief from the court. If the named plaintiff lost 
the case, the result did not bind the class members, who 
were free to file later lawsuits on the same claim, and win or 
lose on the merits without any application of res judicata 
against them.45 
One of the goals of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 was to 
abolish such actions.46 
The distinction between Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions is particularly important in lower courts.47 When 
the Supreme Court issues a ruling, most concerns about the 
scope of injunctive relief become moot. Because the Court has 
nationwide authority, geographic limitations on its power are 
not a concern. Its rulings on federal constitutional and statutory 
law bind all state and federal courts throughout the nation di-
rectly,48 rather than simply binding parties to a particular case 
through res judicata. Government officials are generally ex-
pected to follow such rulings, regardless of whether they were 
parties to the case or subject to an injunction.49 Indeed, in one of 
the most controversial rulings of all time,50 Roe v. Wade, the 
Court held that Texas’s abortion law was unconstitutional, yet 
declared that it was “unnecessary to decide” whether the lower 
                                                                                                        
 45. Weber, supra note 16, at 348. 
 46. Id. at 400; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Advisory Committee’s Note (1966), available 
at 39 F.R.D. 73, 105–06. 
 47. In certain types of cases, however, even the Supreme Court’s decision as to 
whether to grant an injunction can have practical significance. See Morley, Public 
Law at the Cathedral, supra note 30, at 2481–83. 
 48. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in 
the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . .”). 
 49. See, e.g., Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]e have long presumed that officials of the Executive Branch will adhere to 
the law as declared by the court.”). Some scholars reject this position, arguing 
that, while government officials are bound by courts’ judgments, they are not 
required to accept accompanying judicial opinions as definitive constructions of 
the Constitution or federal laws. See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1807, 1844–45 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and 
as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 43–44 (1993). Under this 
view, judicial opinions simply allow government officials to predict how courts 
are likely to resolve future cases. While the possibility of future litigation may 
induce officials to conform their conduct to judicial opinions, particularly those of 
the Supreme Court, there is no reason (beyond an opinion’s persuasive value) for 
government officials to adhere to such interpretations in matters not subject to 
judicial review. 
 50. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
48–49 (1996). 
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court should have enjoined its enforcement. Rather, the Court 
“assume[d] the Texas prosecutorial authorities [would] give 
full credence to [its] decision.”51 For these reasons, Supreme 
Court cases generally act as de facto class actions.52 
The scope of injunctive relief assumes much greater im-
portance in trial and intermediate appellate courts. The breadth 
of an injunction is a critical consideration, particularly at the 
trial level, because trial court opinions generally are not prece-
dential, even within the same district.53 Nor are such rulings 
binding upon a government defendant in subsequent litigation 
against other plaintiffs.54 They generally do not even constitute 
“clearly established” law for the purpose of overcoming quali-
fied immunity.55 Government officials often feel free to “nonac-
quiesce” in (that is, ignore) trial court rulings, and sometimes 
even intermediate appellate court rulings, when dealing with 
anyone other than the litigants involved in those earlier cases 
(particularly when acting in regions outside the prior court’s 
jurisdiction).56 
Moreover, trial and intermediate appellate courts are the fi-
nal arbiters of the overwhelming majority of election law and 
other constitutional issues. Many such issues do not reach the 
                                                                                                        
 51. 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). 
 52. Cf. Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A Com-
ment on the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 573, 574, 577, 580 
(1981) (arguing that Supreme Court cases involving individual litigants act as de 
facto class actions because the Court often issues general statements of law that 
will govern future cases). 
 53. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011). 
 54. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984). 
 55. See, e.g., Marsh v. Butler Cty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1032 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001) (en 
banc); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[D]istrict court deci-
sions cannot clearly establish a constitutional right.”); Richardson v. Selsky, 5 F.3d 
616, 623 (2d Cir. 1993) (same). The Supreme Court has approved of this approach 
without addressing whether a circuit may choose to allow district court rulings to 
clearly establish the law and allow plaintiffs to overcome public officials’ qualified 
immunity. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2033. For these reasons, Timothy Wilton’s expla-
nation as to why class certification is largely irrelevant at the trial level no longer 
remains true, assuming it once was. See Wilton, supra note 23, at 604 (arguing that 
government officials generally “apply a legal declaration in an individual action 
to [any] factually similar group” in order to preserve their qualified immunity 
from suit, and because of the collateral estoppel effects of the earlier ruling). 
 56. See Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral, supra note 30, at 2483–85 & nn.178–86 
(collecting sources); Weber, supra note 16, at 355–58. 
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Supreme Court for years; others might never get there.57 Gov-
ernment entities may refrain from appealing adverse rulings 
due to political pressures, cost constraints, adverse publicity, 
strategic considerations, and changes in political administra-
tions.58 Officials who may have felt duty-bound to defend a 
law’s constitutionality in trial-level proceedings may feel no 
similar compulsion to affirmatively appeal rulings invalidating 
laws or regulations with which they disagree. Conversely, 
supporters of a statute might be reluctant to risk having an ad-
verse ruling affirmed by a higher court, thereby enhancing its 
precedential value and expanding its geographic reach.59 Even 
if lower court rulings and judgments are seen as strictly interim 
measures, courts are currently applying disparate approaches 
in determining the proper scope of injunctive relief, often with-
out recognizing the underlying issues at play, and there is val-
ue to discerning and advocating the correct approach. 
B. Current Approaches 
Courts have applied conflicting approaches in deciding 
whether to issue Plaintiff- or Defendant-Oriented Injunctions 
                                                                                                        
 57. STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 237 (10th ed. 2013) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court grants very few of the thousands of petitions 
for certiorari it receives each year). 
 58. For example, the left-wing group ACORN had filed numerous fraudulent 
voter registration forms and violated other election laws in Florida over the 
course of multiple federal election cycles. See, e.g., Kathleen Haughney, Vote Fraud: 
Is It a Big Problem?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 6, 2012, at A1; Lucy Morgan, Group 
Accused of Voter Registration Violations, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at 5B; 
Sandra Pedicini, ACORN Group Faces Voter-Fraud Accusations, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Oct. 10, 2008, at A3; Brittany Wallman & Alva James-Johnson, 180 Registration 
Forms Surface in South Florida, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 27, 2004, at 4B. In response, the 
state legislature enacted a law imposing additional restrictions and safeguards on 
third-party voter-registration efforts. FLA. STAT. § 97.0575 (2011). A federal district 
court issued a preliminary injunction against the law. League of Women Voters of 
Fla. v. Browning, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (N.D. Fla. 2012). Instead of appealing the 
case to the Eleventh Circuit, however, the State abandoned potentially meritori-
ous arguments in defense of the law and consented to entry of a permanent in-
junction against it. 
 59. Cf. Lisa Estrada, Buying the Status Quo on Affirmative Action: The Piscataway 
Settlement and Its Lessons About Interest Group Path Manipulation, 9 GEO. MASON U. 
C.R. L.J. 207, 207–17 (1999) (discussing a settlement paid to prevent a white victim 
of affirmative action from pursuing her case in the U.S. Supreme Court in Taxman 
v. Board of Education of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 
1117 (1997), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997)). 
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when they conclude that a legal provision is invalid, whether 
on constitutional, statutory, or other grounds. 
1. Presumptive Issuance of Defendant-Oriented Injunctions 
Some jurisdictions have held that a court should presump-
tively enjoin government defendants from enforcing an invalid 
legal provision against anyone, to the extent of its invalidity.60 
Such assertions sometimes appear without any explanation or 
consideration of competing factors.61 Perhaps most surprisingly, 
some courts use their ability to completely enjoin enforcement of 
a law through a Defendant-Oriented Injunction as a justification 
for refusing to certify a proposed class, on the grounds that class 
certification is purportedly unnecessary.62 Nationwide Defend-
                                                                                                        
 60. See Wilton, supra note 23, at 603 (“Plaintiffs in most social reform cases will 
be able to obtain the identical declaratory or injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees 
award in both individual and class action suits.”); see also Garrett, supra note 15, at 
634 (“[T]he equitable discretion of the judge . . . does permit judges even in indi-
vidual cases to extend injunctive relief to a class . . . .”). 
 61. See, e.g., Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(“When a reviewing court determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the 
ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—not that their application to the indi-
vidual petitioners is proscribed.”); Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 
173, 178 (4th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he plaintiffs could receive the same injunctive relief in 
their individual action as they sought by the filing of their proposed class ac-
tion . . . .”); A-1 Cigarette Vending, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 345, 358 (2001) 
(“When a challenge is brought to the validity of a regulation, as opposed to a chal-
lenge to the application of an otherwise valid regulation, the district court’s de-
termination will be binding upon the entire agency across the nation.”); Caspar v. 
Snyder, 77 F. Supp. 3d 616, 642 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (“[A] plaintiff may seek an in-
junction applicable to all similarly-situated individuals harmed by the same un-
constitutional practice, without the necessity of seeking class-action treatment.”) 
(collecting cases); see also Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 781 (9th 
Cir. 1986); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 808 (3d Cir. 1984); Planned 
Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sprogis v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir. 1971) (“Rule 23 to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the district court possesses such power in Title VII cases” to 
award Defendant-Oriented Injunctions to individual plaintiffs.); Am. Fed’n Gov’t 
Emps. v. Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d in part and vacated in 
part, 926 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Walker, supra note 23, at 1122–23 & n.27 (dis-
cussing examples). 
 62. See Tenny, supra note 23, at 1019 n.8 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Ihrke v. N. 
States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572–73 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 
(1972); Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Green v. Wil-
liams, No. CIV-4-78-34, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17881, at *7–8 (E.D. Tenn. May 18, 
1981); Barnes v. Reagen, 501 F. Supp. 215, 221 n.20 (N.D. Iowa 1980); Gray v. Int’l 
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 73 F.R.D. 638, 640 (D.D.C. 1977). Earlier editions of the 
Manual for Complex Litigation stated, “It is rarely necessary . . . to maintain a class 
action in cases in which declaratory or injunctive relief is sought because of the 
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ant-Oriented Injunctions can lead to awkward conflicts in which 
one court refuses to adopt the conclusion of a court in another 
jurisdiction that a legal provision is invalid, despite the fact that 
the other court has enjoined the governmental defendant from 
enforcing that provision anywhere.63 
Justice Blackmun endorsed Defendant-Oriented Injunctions 
in the administrative law context in his oft-quoted dissent in 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, stating: 
In some cases the “agency action” will consist of a rule of 
broad applicability; and if the plaintiff prevails, the result is 
that the rule is invalidated, not simply that the court forbids 
its application to a particular individual. Under these cir-
cumstances a single plaintiff, so long as he is injured by the 
rule, may obtain “programmatic” relief that affects the rights 
of parties not before the court.64 
Courts occasionally justify Defendant-Oriented Injunctions 
on the grounds that a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction would un-
fairly give special rights to the plaintiffs in the case, while al-
lowing the invalid legal provision to remain in effect for other, 
similarly situated parties.65 For example, in Wirtz v. Baldor Elec-
tric Co., a few electronics businesses sued to have the Secretary 
of Labor’s determination as to the prevailing wage in the elec-
tronics industry invalidated.66 The D.C. Circuit held that it was 
unnecessary to determine whether the suit should have been 
certified as a class action.67 It declared that, so long as one of the 
plaintiff businesses had standing to sue, the district court 
“should enjoin the effectiveness of the Secretary’s determina-
tion with respect to the entire industry.”68 
                                                                                                        
alleged facial unconstitutionality of a federal or state statute or regulation.” MAN-
UAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.401 (1973). The latest edition of the Manual has 
abandoned this position. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
(FOURTH) (2004). 
 63. See, e.g., Biggs v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785–86 (E.D. Mich. 
2014) (“The proposition that a district court may issue injunctions that bind par-
ties outside its geographic jurisdiction is distinct from whether this Court must, as 
a matter of binding order or precedent, adopt the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that 
[an agency issuance] is void ab initio.”). 
 64. 497 U.S. 871, 913 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 65. Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 534. 
 66. Id. at 533. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 535. 
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The D.C. Circuit explained, “[A] court order enjoining the 
Secretary’s determination for the sole benefit of [the] plaintiffs-
appellees who have standing to sue would . . . give them an 
unconscionable bargaining advantage over other firms in the 
industry.”69 After discussing some of the likely negative ramifi-
cations of such a limited ruling, the court concluded, “At the 
very least, substantial wage inequities among firms and em-
ployees in the industry might be created, based solely on the 
random application of a wage determination held invalid as to 
some but not all members of the industry.”70 
It added that the lawsuit—despite being brought by com-
mercial businesses to further their own interests—was “vindi-
cat[ing] the public interest in having congressional enactments 
properly interpreted and applied.”71 The court concluded, “‘As 
it is principally the protection of the public interest with which 
we are here concerned, no artificial restrictions of the court’s 
power to grant equitable relief in the furtherance of that inter-
est can be acknowledged.’”72 In another case reaching the same 
conclusion, the court emphasized that a Defendant-Oriented 
Injunction completely precluding the government defendant 
from enforcing an invalid regulation would alleviate the need 
for duplicative litigation from other people adversely affected 
by it.73 
Courts in election law and voting rights cases often issue De-
fendant-Oriented Injunctions without recognizing or address-
ing most of their ramifications.74 For example, in Frank v. Walk-
                                                                                                        
 69. Id. at 534. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 534–35. 
 72. Id. at 535 (quoting Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 259 
F.2d 921, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). It is worth noting that the quoted language from 
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n was ripped wholly out of context. That case fo-
cused solely on whether a federal court may stay an administrative proceeding 
before the Federal Power Commission, and had nothing to do with the distinction 
between Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions. Va. Petroleum Jobbers 
Ass’n, 259 F.2d at 923–24. 
 73. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998); see also A-1 Cigarette Vending, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 345, 358 
(2001) (“It would be senseless to require the relitigation of the validity of a regula-
tion in all federal district courts . . . .”). 
 74. See, e.g., Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 437 (6th Cir. 2012) (issuing 
Defendant-Oriented Injunction requiring the Ohio Secretary of State to allow the 
general public to vote during portions of the early voting period open to military 
voters); Fair Elections Ohio v. Husted, 47 F. Supp. 3d 607, 617 (S.D. Ohio 2014) 
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er,75 a group of individual plaintiffs brought a putative class 
action suit challenging Act 23, Wisconsin’s voter identification 
law.76 The district court refused to certify the putative class,77 
but held that the law was unconstitutional78 and entered a De-
fendant-Oriented Injunction barring the Governor and the state 
agency responsible for elections from enforcing it.79 The court 
explained, “[I]nvalidating Act 23 is the only practicable way to 
remove the unjustified burdens placed on the substantial num-
ber of eligible voters who lack IDs.”80 
The state had argued for a less restrictive alternative, sug-
gesting that the court could permit people without photo IDs to 
vote if they satisfied certain alternative requirements or signed 
affidavits at their polling places affirming their identities. The 
court rejected such suggestions on the grounds that it would 
have to rewrite the statute to implement them.81 Importantly, 
neither the court nor the parties addressed the possibility of 
granting relief just to the individual plaintiffs by enjoining the 
photo ID law solely in regard to them. 
Intriguingly, the court explained that the plaintiffs’ motion 
for class certification was moot precisely because “all members 
of the proposed classes will benefit from the permanent in-
junction whether or not classes are certified.”82 Thus, in the dis-
trict court’s view, there was “no reason to formally certify a 
class.”83 The district court offered no explanation as to how it 
could effectively grant classwide relief in a non-class-action 
case. The Seventh Circuit ultimately overturned the district 
                                                                                                        
(“[The Court] ENJOINS Defendants from treating [any] late-jailed electors any 
differently from late-hospitalized electors.”), vacated on other grounds, 770 F.3d 456 
(6th Cir. 2014). 
 75. 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015). 
 76. 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 104. 
 77. Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 880. 
 78. Id. at 863 (“[T]he burdens imposed by Act 23 on those who lack an ID are not 
justified.”). 
 79. Id. (“[T]he only practicable remedy is to enjoin enforcement of the photo ID 
requirement.”). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 880. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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court’s ruling on the merits, finding the photo ID law constitu-
tional, and vacated the injunction.84 
In Applewhite v. Commonwealth, individual plaintiffs and ad-
vocacy groups challenged Pennsylvania’s voter identification 
law in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had “established a clear right to 
relief from enforcement of the photo ID provisions.”85 Despite 
its reference to the rights of the plaintiffs, the court “perma-
nently enjoin[ed] enforcement of the photo ID provisions” 
against anyone.86 It neither justified the scope of its ruling nor 
addressed the possibility of tailoring relief solely to the plain-
tiffs. To the contrary, at one point the court stated, “To the ex-
tent Petitioners’ challenge is deemed as applied rather than fa-
                                                                                                        
 84. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 
(2014). Comparable sequences of events have occurred in other challenges to voter 
identification laws. In Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff ’d in 
part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 
2015), the district court ruled in favor of individual and associational plaintiffs’ 
claims, id. at 632 n.3, 679, that Texas’s voter identification statute violated the First, 
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, id. at 693, 703, as well as 
the Voting Rights Act, id. at 698, 703. The court entered “a permanent and final 
injunction against enforcement” of the voter ID law against anyone. Id. at 705. 
Neither the court nor the parties addressed the possibility of entering a Plaintiff-
Oriented Injunction barring enforcement of the law against only the individual 
plaintiffs, or members of the plaintiff organizations. 
 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit overturned the trial court’s conclusion that the law 
was enacted with a discriminatory purpose, but affirmed its ruling that the law 
had a disparate impact. Veasey, 796 F.3d at 519–20. The appellate court vacated the 
trial court’s injunction and judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Id.; 
see also ACLU v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605–06 (D.N.M. 2007) (holding 
that the associational plaintiffs lacked independent organizational standing to 
pursue their claims and could only assert the rights of their members, but entering 
Defendant-Oriented Injunction barring the city from enforcing its voter identifica-
tion law against anyone on Equal Protection grounds), rev’d, 546 F.3d 1313, 1323–
25 (10th Cir. 2008) (overturning injunction because the voter identification law 
was constitutional); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1329–31 
(N.D. Ga. 2005) (entering preliminary Defendant-Oriented Injunction against 
Georgia’s voter identification law), subsequent proceeding at 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 
1360 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (entering identical preliminary injunction against amended 
version of law), vacated, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1372–74 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (denying 
permanent injunction because the plaintiffs failed to prove their case at trial), va-
cated on other grounds, 554 F.3d 1340, 1355 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of 
permanent injunction). 
 85. Determination on Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction at 45, 49, 
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 300 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *26 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014). 
 86. Id. at *24. 
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cial, the same analysis renders the photo ID provi-
sions . . . unconstitutional as applied to all qualified electors 
who lack compliant photo ID.”87 
In Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, a group of 
individual and associational plaintiffs challenged Ohio legal 
provisions that eliminated same-day voter registration, as well 
as early voting on Sundays and in the evening.88 The district 
court agreed that the changes likely violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.89 The court 
stated it was entering a preliminary injunction “with the pur-
pose of preventing irreparable injury, in the form of infringe-
ment to their fundamental right to vote, to the Plaintiffs.”90 It 
nevertheless enjoined the Ohio Secretary of State from reduc-
ing the early voting period, or ending Sunday and evening vot-
ing, for anyone during the 2014 general election,91 rather than 
only granting additional voting opportunities to the individual 
plaintiffs or members of the plaintiff organizations.92 
                                                                                                        
 87. Id. at *65. 
 88. 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 813–14 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (NAACP I), aff’d 768 F.3d 524 (6th 
Cir. 2014) (NAACP II), stay granted sub nom. Husted v. Ohio State Conference of 
the NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (order) (NAACP III), vacated on other grounds sub 
nom. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 
10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014) (NAACP IV). 
 89. NAACP I, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 847–51. 
 90. Id. at 852 (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. at 853. 
 92. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction. NAACP II, 768 F.3d at 
529. The Supreme Court, however, immediately stayed it, allowing the enjoined 
Ohio laws to remain in effect. NAACP III, 135 S. Ct. at 42 (order); see Richard L. 
Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2545676 
[http://perma.cc/DDT8-AS56] (discussing the Supreme Court’s reluctance to allow 
courts to order substantial changes to the rules governing an election shortly be-
fore it occurs). Once the 2014 election passed, the Sixth Circuit vacated the prelim-
inary injunction as moot. NAACP IV, 2014 WL 10384647, at *1. 
 The Fourth Circuit entered a similar Defendant-Oriented Injunction to prevent 
North Carolina from eliminating its same-day voter registration period. League of 
Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 248–49 (4th Cir. 2014), stay 
granted, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (order), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015). The Supreme 
Court likewise stayed that ruling from taking effect immediately before the 2014 
election, League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) 
(order), but ultimately denied certiorari, League of Women Voters of N.C. v. 
North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015) (order). 
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2. Mandatory Issuance of Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions 
Several circuits, in contrast, emphasize the Supreme Court’s 
directive in Califano v. Yamasaki that “injunctive relief should be 
no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to pro-
vide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”93 These jurisdictions have 
held that enjoining enforcement of a law, or otherwise restrict-
ing a defendant’s conduct, toward parties not before the court 
violates Califano’s proscription because such additional relief 
generally is unnecessary to make the plaintiffs whole.94 In their 
view, a Defendant-Oriented Injunction implicitly converts an 
individual suit into a de facto class action.95 
The Supreme Court further bolstered the propriety of Plain-
tiff-Oriented Injunctions in Doran v. Salem Inn., Inc., in which it 
held, “[N]either declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly 
interfere with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances 
except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs.”96 Else-
where, the Court has held that, in the absence of class certifica-
                                                                                                        
 93. 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (emphasis added); see also Prof’l Ass’n of Coll. Edu-
cators, TSTA/NEA v. El Paso Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 730 F.2d 258, 273–74 (5th Cir. 
1984) (“Intrusion of federal courts into state agencies should extend no further 
than necessary to protect federal rights of the parties.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Meyer v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 648 F.3d 154, 169–71 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 273 (6th Cir. 2003); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, 
158 F.3d 742, 766–67 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 527 U.S. 
1031 (1999); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727–28 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1983); see also 
Brown v. Trs. of Brown Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 361 (1st Cir. 1989); Williams, supra 
note 15, at 651. 
 95. See, e.g., Meyer, 648 F.3d at 171 (“Once decertification became effective, the 
District Court had no jurisdiction over any of the claims of the putative class 
members and therefore no ability to order that any relief be granted to any claim-
ant other than [the individual plaintiff].”); Sharpe, 319 F.3d at 273 (“The injunction 
issued by the district court is overly broad in that the class wide focus is complete-
ly unnecessary to provide the named plaintiffs the relief to which they are entitled 
as prevailing parties.”); Lowery, 158 F.3d at 766 (concluding that a Defendant-
Oriented Injunction prohibiting racial discrimination “inappropriately grants 
what amounts to class-wide relief” for individual claims); Brown, 891 F.2d at 361 
(“Ordinarily, classwide relief, such as the injunction here which prohibits sex dis-
crimination against the class of Boston University faculty, is appropriate only 
where there is a properly certified class.”); Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727–28 & n.1 
(“Without a properly certified class, a court cannot grant relief on a class-wide 
basis.”). 
 96. 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); see, e.g., McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 
1019–20 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Doran to issue Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction); see 
also United States Dep’t of Def. v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939, 939 (1993) (order) (stay-
ing lower court injunction insofar as it prohibited the military from applying its 
regulations to anyone other than the individual plaintiff). 
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tion, an “action is not properly a class action” and should not 
be treated as such.97 Many courts have held that these princi-
ples require them to issue Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions, pro-
hibiting enforcement of an unconstitutional98 or otherwise inva-
lid99 legal provision only against the individual plaintiffs in a 
suit while leaving the government defendants free to enforce 
that provision against anyone else.100 
Although such courts recognize that a broader injunction 
may occasionally be necessary in non-class cases to fully secure 
the individual plaintiffs’ rights, they emphasize that the focus 
of the order must be on securing the plaintiffs’ rights, rather 
than those of third parties.101 This principle, properly under-
                                                                                                        
 97. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 310 n.1 (1976). 
 98. See, e.g., Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir. 
1994) (narrowing district court’s injunction to prohibit the Navy from discharging 
the individual plaintiff for admitting he was gay, without precluding the Navy 
from taking such action with regard to anyone else); Vives v. City of New York, 
305 F. Supp. 2d 289, 303–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Although the Court has no doubt 
that the enforcement of section 240.30(1) with respect to ‘annoying’ or ‘alarming’ 
conduct is unconstitutional as applied to anyone . . . it is outside the scope of the 
Court’s power to enjoin the NYPD from enforcing the statute against non-
parties.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 405 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing dis-
trict court’s ruling that defendants did not have qualified immunity against plain-
tiff’s claim for damages); Zelotes v. Adams, 363 B.R. 660, 667 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
2007) (“An injunction applying only to Plaintiff—i.e., barring Defendant from 
enforcing § 526(a)(4) against him—will provide Plaintiff with complete relief. It is 
not necessary to make the injunction any broader.”), rev’d on other grounds, 606 
F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 99. See, e.g., L.A. Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 665 (9th Cir. 
2011) (“An order declaring the hospice cap regulation invalid, enjoining further 
enforcement against [the individual plaintiff], and requiring the Secretary to re-
calculate its liability in conformity with the hospice cap statute, would have af-
forded the plaintiff complete relief. . . . [T]he nationwide injunction must be vacat-
ed . . . .”); Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 
436 (4th Cir. 2003) (overturning injunction that completely barred the defendant 
agency from applying its invalid interpretation of a federal statute to all mining 
within a certain region, because the plaintiff organization alleged injury only in 
connection with one particular site within that region); Native Angels Home Care 
Agency, Inc. v. Sebelius, 749 F. Supp. 2d 370, 379 (E.D.N.C. 2010); Russell-Murray 
Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 724 F. Supp. 2d 43, 60 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 100. Interestingly, this principle has sometimes been invoked as a response to 
Younger abstention arguments, to demonstrate that a plaintiff’s constitutional 
challenges to a state law could proceed in federal court despite pending state-level 
prosecutions against other people. See, e.g., Mass. Delivery Ass’n v. Coakley, 671 
F.3d 33, 43–44 (1st Cir. 2012); Womens Servs., P.C. v. Douglas, 653 F.2d 355, 358–
59 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 101. Prof’l Ass’n of Coll. Educators, TSTA/NEA v. El Paso Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 
730 F.2d 258, 273–74 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[A]n injunction . . . is not necessarily made 
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stood, is a narrow exception to the preference for Plaintiff-Ori-
ented Injunctions. A court may issue a Defendant-Oriented In-
junction only if widespread relief is “inevitable to remedy the 
individual plaintiffs’ rights,”102 as in redistricting or desegrega-
tion cases.103 
In Virginia Society for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, for example, an 
anti-abortion non-profit corporation challenged an FEC regu-
lation defining the term “express advocacy.”104 The corporation 
argued that the definition was impermissibly broad, because it 
caused groups to become subject to the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act’s disclosure and other administrative requirements 
simply for engaging in speech concerning political issues (such 
as abortion), rather than speech specifically aimed at impend-
ing elections.105 The district court agreed that the regulation vi-
olated the First Amendment and enjoined the FEC from en-
forcing it against the plaintiff corporation or “any other party 
in the United States of America.”106 
The Fourth Circuit agreed that the regulation was unconsti-
tutional,107 but held that the “the district court abused its dis-
cretion by issuing a nationwide injunction,” because it was 
“broader than necessary to afford full relief to [the corpora-
tion].”108 The court added that “[p]reventing the FEC from en-
forcing [the regulation] against other parties in other circuits 
does not provide any additional relief to [the plaintiff].”109 It 
also pointed out that a nationwide injunction would prevent 
other circuits from considering the regulation’s constitutional-
                                                                                                        
overbroad by extending benefit or protection to persons other than prevailing 
parties in [a] lawsuit—even if it is not a class action—if such breadth is necessary 
to give prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled.”); accord Brown v. 
Trs. of Brown Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 361 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Meyer v. Brown & 
Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]here are many cases where 
injunctive relief designed to assist a party will accidently assist persons not before 
the court.”). 
 102. Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 728 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 103. See supra note 15. 
 104. 263 F.3d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2000)). 
 105. Id. at 381–82. 
 106. Id. at 382. 
 107. Id. at 392. 
 108. Id. at 393. 
 109. Id. 
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ity for themselves, giving the Fourth Circuit’s ruling binding 
effect outside of the court’s geographic jurisdiction.110 
The same issue arose in N.Y. Progress & Protection PAC v. 
Walsh.111 The plaintiff was a state-level independent-expendi-
ture-only political committee (colloquially, a “SuperPAC”) that 
challenged the constitutionality of New York’s contribution 
limits as applied to it. The SuperPAC pointed out that the Su-
preme Court had held that independent expenditures are not 
corrupting and the government therefore may not limit a per-
son’s ability to make such expenditures. It argued that the gov-
ernment likewise should be barred from limiting the amount 
that a person may contribute to a SuperPAC, because such enti-
ties exclusively make independent expenditures.112 
Without addressing the merits of the SuperPAC’s claims, the 
district court denied its motion for a preliminary injunction be-
cause it would be against the public interest.113 The court also 
expressed “confusion” over whether the requested injunction 
would apply to all SuperPACs, or only the particular plaintiff 
before it.114 It stated, “Because Plaintiff brings this challenge as 
applied to independent expenditure-only organizations and 
solely on [its own] behalf, this Court may lack the authority to 
order enjoinment of the statute beyond the parties to this 
case.”115 The court then expressed concern that, if its injunction 
ran solely to the SuperPAC plaintiff, that entity’s voice would be 
“amplif[ied] . . . over the voices of other political committees.”116 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s 
ruling, holding that the First Amendment prohibits states from 
limiting contributions to SuperPACs because independent ex-
penditures do not pose a substantial risk of corruption.117 It 
agreed with the district court that a preliminary injunction 
                                                                                                        
 110. Id. 
 111. No. 13 Civ. 6769 (PAC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149598 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 
2013), rev’d, 733 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 2013), on remand 17 F. Supp. 3d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
 112. Id. at *3. 
 113. Id. at *13–14. 
 114. Id. at *18–19. 
 115. Id. at *20. 
 116. Id. 
 117. N.Y. Prog. & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013), on remand 
17 F. Supp. 3d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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would apply only to the plaintiff SuperPAC in that case.118 It 
held that such a limited injunction would not cause “severe 
disruptions to the election process itself” or other “sufficiently 
particularized” injuries that “outweigh[ed] the irreparable 
harm that stems from restrictions on political speech.”119 On 
remand, the district court begrudgingly enjoined the defend-
ants from enforcing New York’s contribution limit against the 
SuperPAC plaintiff and its donors.120 
3. Intermediate or Compromise Approaches 
Many jurisdictions have adopted compromise approaches. 
Several courts have emphasized that they have discretion as to 
whether to issue a Plaintiff- or Defendant-Oriented Injunc-
tion.121 Others have held that, while permanent injunctions 
must be Defendant-Oriented, at least when administrative reg-
ulations are invalidated under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, preliminary injunctions may be Plaintiff-Oriented.122 
Some courts, particularly those within circuits that generally 
frown upon Defendant-Oriented Injunctions, effectively apply 
compromise approaches through their willingness (to the point 
of inaccuracy) to hold that a Defendant-Oriented Injunction is 
necessary to fully enforce a plaintiff’s rights. In Bresgal v. 
Brock,123 for example, a few migrant foresters and an association 
challenged Department of Labor regulations124 that excluded 
commercial forestry workers from the Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Protection Act.125 The foresters argued 
that they were entitled to the protections that the Act granted 
to “agricultural workers.”126 Both the district court and Ninth 
                                                                                                        
 118. Id. at 489. 
 119. Id. 
 120. N.Y. Prog. & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 17 F. Supp. 3d 319, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 121. See, e.g., Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241–
42 (D. Colo. 2011); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2004); Heart-
wood, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 73 F. Supp. 2d 962, 977 (S.D. Ill. 1999). 
 122. See, e.g., U.S. Ass’n of Reptile Keepers v. Jewell, Civ. No. 13-2007 (RDM), 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65351, at *9 (D.D.C. May 19, 2015). 
 123. 843 F.2d 1163, 1165 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 124. 29 C.F.R. §§ 780.115, 780.200 (1982). 
 125. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(3) (1982). 
 126. Bresgal, 843 F.2d at 1165–66. 
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Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the law and 
held that the regulation was invalid.127 
The district court entered an injunction requiring the De-
partment of Labor to apply the Act to foresters throughout the 
nation.128 On appeal, the Government argued that the injunc-
tion should be narrowed, to require the Department of Labor to 
apply the Act’s protections solely to the individual plaintiffs.129 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Government’s argument. It 
agreed that, under its prior ruling in Zepeda,130 courts must 
“narrowly tailor[]” relief to the “specific harm shown” when it 
can be “structured on an individual basis.”131 Without address-
ing the involvement of the associational plaintiff, the Ninth 
Circuit invoked the principle that “an injunction is not neces-
sarily made over-broad by extending benefit or protection to 
persons other than prevailing parties in the lawsuit—even if it 
is not a class action—if such breadth is necessary to give pre-
vailing parties the relief to which they are entitled.”132 
The court asserted that the Act could not be enforced “on any-
thing other than a nationwide basis.”133 It went on to conclu-
sorily declare, without explanation, “The Act cannot be enforced 
only against those contractors who have dealings with named 
plaintiffs, or against those contractors only insofar as they have 
dealings with named plaintiffs.”134 The court also summarily re-
jected the argument, again without explanation, that the effects 
of its ruling should be confined to the Ninth Circuit, to allow the 
Government to continue applying its interpretation to non-
parties in other jurisdictions.135 The court did not explain why it 
was necessary to compel the Department of Labor to extend the 
Act to all foresters, as well as to all contractors who hire forest-
ers, rather than solely the named plaintiffs and their present and 
                                                                                                        
 127. Id. at 1168. 
 128. Id. at 1169. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 131. Bresgal, 843 F.2d at 1170. 
 132. Id. at 1170–71 (emphasis omitted). 
 133. Id. at 1171. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1169–70; see also Citizens for Better Forestry v. United States Dep’t of 
Agric., Nos. C-05-1144 PJH, C-04-4512 PJH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51378, at *53–55 
(N.D. Cal. July 3, 2007) (rejecting similar argument for geographic limits on in-
junction). 
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perhaps future employers. Bresgal is an example of a court 
adopting a sweeping, and likely inaccurate, interpretation of the 
“complete relief” exception to circuit precedents mandating 
Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions. 
C. Theoretical Tensions Underlying the Dispute 
Much of the difficulty concerning the choice between Plaintiff- 
and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions stems from three related 
dichotomies. The first is between substance and procedure. It is 
common to say, as a matter of substantive constitutional law, 
that when a court determines a law is facially invalid, “the state 
may not enforce it under any circumstances.”136 Likewise, when 
a statute is held unconstitutional as applied in certain cases, 
courts and commentators speak as if the government may not 
enforce it under those circumstances.137 
Procedural law, however, tells a very different story. A 
judgment generally does not apply beyond the immediate par-
ties to a case.138 Moreover, individual plaintiffs in non-class 
cases in federal court generally lack Article III standing to seek 
relief for anyone other than themselves;139 an injunction award-
ing relief solely in their favor is sufficient to moot their claims. 
Completely enjoining a government defendant from enforcing 
an unconstitutional legal provision effectively converts an in-
dividual lawsuit into a class action without satisfying the re-
quirements of Rule 23.140 
Allowing individual plaintiffs to obtain injunctions to en-
force the rights of others outside the context of class-action liti-
                                                                                                        
 136. Dorf, supra note 10, at 236; see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Re-
publican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (holding that a facially unconstitutional 
law “is unconstitutional in all of its applications”). 
 137. Dorf, supra note 10, at 236 (“[W]hen a court holds a statute unconstitutional 
as applied to particular facts, the state may enforce a statute in different circum-
stances.”). 
 138. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general applica-
tion in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in 
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party . . . .”). A lawsuit 
may bind certain third parties, such as the litigants’ privies, under certain narrow 
circumstances. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 & 894 n.8 (2008). 
 139. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (“In the ordinary course, a litigant 
must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to 
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”); accord Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013). 
 140. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(2). 
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gation also may violate the rights of those third parties not be-
fore the court. The plaintiffs are permitted to leverage the 
rights of third parties over whom the court has not acquired 
personal jurisdiction, without the consent of those third par-
ties—indeed, often without their knowledge—and without giv-
ing them an opportunity to opt out. Government defendants 
may be enjoined from enforcing a law against people who sup-
port the measure, would prefer or even benefit from its en-
forcement, and would gladly refrain from enforcing their rights 
against it. When courts grant sweeping injunctive relief against 
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid measures in individual-
plaintiff cases, they generally fail to consider or address these 
factors. Thus, tension exists between the apparent dictates of 
substantive law, which contemplates nullification of a legal 
provision when a court (apparently, any court) determines it is 
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, and the procedural, ju-
risdictional, and related limits of the process through which 
courts make such determinations. 
A second important dichotomy that exacerbates the difficulty 
of determining the proper scope of injunctive relief concerns 
the power of district courts themselves. On the one hand, a 
court has the power to certify statewide or even nationwide 
classes and issue injunctions restricting a defendant’s behavior 
anywhere in a state or the nation.141 On the other hand, most 
trial and intermediate appellate courts tend to have limited ter-
ritorial jurisdictions; their legal opinions have no precedential 
force outside those boundaries.142 The opinions of most trial 
courts, including federal district courts, generally lack prece-
dential effect even within their territorial jurisdictions.143 More-
over, government defendants generally are not subject to non-
mutual offensive collateral estoppel. In other words, when a 
                                                                                                        
 141. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702–03 (1979). 
 142. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) (“‘A decision of a federal 
district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, 
the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.’” (quot-
ing 18 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 134.02[1][d] (3d ed. 2011))); 
see also Duran-Quezada v. Clark Constr. Group, LLC, 582 F. App’x 238, 239 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“[T]he decisions of other circuits are not binding . . . .”); 
Hill v. Kan. Gas Serv. Co., 323 F.3d 858, 869 (10th Cir. 2003) (same). A few states, 
such as Maryland, have a single, centralized intermediate appellate court that, like 
the state supreme court, exercises statewide jurisdiction. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. 
& JUD. PROC. §§ 1-401 to 1-403 (West 2016). 
 143. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2033 n.7. 
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government official or agency loses a case concerning the va-
lidity or proper interpretation of a legal provision, it may at-
tempt to relitigate and prevail on the same points against dif-
ferent opponents.144 Additionally, trial court opinions generally 
are not even considered in determining whether a government 
official may be stripped of qualified immunity because the law 
she allegedly violated was “clearly established.”145 
A trial court’s opinion holding a law unconstitutional or oth-
erwise invalid generally has the legal status of a law review 
article: the ruling is solely of persuasive value, both within the 
court’s jurisdiction and elsewhere.146 Thus, the scope of a trial 
court’s power when invalidating a legal provision depends in 
large part on the type of tool it chooses to use.147 Allowing a 
trial court to enter an injunction that sweeps beyond the parties 
to a given case gives the court’s opinion the force of law 
throughout the state or nation and effectively nullifies govern-
ment defendants’ prerogative to avoid non-mutual offensive 
collateral estoppel.148 Issuing a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction, in 
contrast, tailors the scope of injunctive relief more closely to the 
territorial scope of a trial court’s other powers. 
The final dichotomy giving rise to these issues lies in the 
competing roles of the federal judicial system.149 Most rules 
governing the judicial process are crafted to facilitate tradi-
tional private litigation between parties concerning their re-
                                                                                                        
 144. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984). 
 145. See supra note 55. 
 146. Cf. Baude, supra note 49, at 1844–45 (arguing that the executive branch is 
obligated to obey court judgments, but not necessarily to adhere to judicial opin-
ions); Merrill, supra note 49, at 44 (same). But see Cooper v Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 
(1958) (“[T]he interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this 
Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land . . . .”); Larry Alexander & 
Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455 
(2000) (arguing that judicial opinions have the same force of law as judgments). 
 147. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral, supra note 30, at 2461–65; see also Merrill, 
supra note 49, at 58–59. 
 148. Cf. Walker, supra note 23, at 1134–35. Furthermore, important constitutional 
issues are prevented from “percolating” through the lower courts, to give differ-
ent courts the opportunity to craft competing approaches for the Supreme Court 
to consider. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (“[W]hen frontier legal problems are presented, periods of ‘percolation’ in, 
and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts may yield a better 
informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.”). 
 149. See Walker, supra note 23, at 1134. 
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spective rights and duties toward each other.150 Even most liti-
gation against the government is of this nature. In a typical So-
cial Security case, for example, a claimant may challenge the 
interpretation or validity of a Social Security Administration 
regulation in order to increase the amount of her own benefits, 
without regard to whether or how the regulation is enforced 
against others.151 Or in a criminal case, a defendant asserting a 
constitutional defense to a statute generally is focused primar-
ily on avoiding conviction, rather than preventing the statute 
from being applied to others.152 The real parties-in-interest in 
such suits are generally involved as litigants.153 
In contrast, many plaintiffs in election-related lawsuits—and 
especially the nonprofit organizations that coordinate the liti-
gation and represent the plaintiffs—seek not just to enforce 
their own rights, but to completely invalidate allegedly uncon-
stitutional election regulations to ensure they cannot be applied 
to anyone. The main focus of the litigation is the overall con-
duct of the election as a whole. Such plaintiffs often seek broad 
court orders allowing others to contribute154 or spend155 more 
money in connection with the election; making it easier for oth-
ers to vote; or increasing the potential (however minimally) for 
invalid, unauthorized, improperly cast, or fraudulent votes to 
dilute or nullify the votes of duly qualified and eligible vot-
ers.156 At a minimum, the relief they seek can contribute to, or 
                                                                                                        
 150. Lon L. Fuller, The Form and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 
(1978) (describing traditional model of adjudication); see also Abram Chayes, The 
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282–88 (1976). 
 151. See, e.g., Shinn v Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 152. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (upholding defend-
ant’s First Amendment defense to criminal prosecution under the Stolen Valor 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), for lying about receiving military decorations). 
 153. Fuller, supra note 150, at 369, 385–87. 
 154. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014). 
 155. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S 310, 359–60 (2010). 
 156. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226 (1974) (holding that a person 
has the constitutional right to have his or her vote be “given full value and effect, 
without being diluted or distorted by the casting of fraudulent” or otherwise inva-
lid ballots); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (holding that a per-
son’s right to vote is “denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of [his or 
her] vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the fran-
chise”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (holding that the right to vote is 
violated by “dilution” of people’s votes through means such as “stuffing of the 
ballot box”); see generally Morley, State Constitutions, supra note 8, at 192–93 (dis-
cussing the “defensive” right to vote). 
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detract from, the perceived fairness or integrity of the system.157 
Such cases thus resemble the type of public law structural re-
form litigation discussed by Owen Fiss158 and Abram Chayes.159 
Courts that view their role to be the defense of public values 
and constitutional principles, rather than simply the adjudica-
tion of private disputes, will strongly prefer Defendant-Ori-
ented Injunctions.160 
Broad Defendant-Oriented Injunctions flow naturally from 
substantive constitutional or administrative law: when a legal 
provision is invalid, many courts feel compelled to prevent it 
from being applied to anyone.161 They are empowered to do so 
by their authority to enter broad nationwide injunctions, and 
such relief is consistent with the Fiss-Chayes conception of 
courts as guarantors of public values and constitutional princi-
ples. Narrower Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions, in contrast, flow 
from the procedural and jurisdictional limitations to which 
courts are generally subject: they may award relief only to 
plaintiffs with standing, their powers are constrained by 
Rule 23, their opinions have the force of law only within a lim-
ited geographic region, and their main focus is on resolving a 
particular dispute and enforcing the rights of the litigants be-
fore them. Both of these visions of the federal judiciary are 
compelling for different reasons and can claim strong support, 
making the choice between Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions that much more difficult. 
                                                                                                        
 157. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197 (2008) (“[P]ublic 
confidence in the integrity of the electoral process has independent significance, 
because it encourages citizen participation in the democratic process.”); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–29 (1976) (recognizing that the government’s interest in pre-
venting the “appearance of corruption” is as compelling as its interest in combat-
ing actual corruption itself); see generally Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake 
of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1568 (2012) (noting that appearances can be 
important for their own sake because they influence the underlying reality, creat-
ing a type of self-fulfilling prophecy). 
 158. Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–29 (1978); see also 
FISS, supra note 37, at 94. 
 159. Chayes, supra note 150, at 1284; see also Miller, supra note 52, at 583 (noting 
that, beginning in the last half of the twentieth century, the “form” of adjudication 
has remained the same, but the “substance” of what the Court is actually doing 
has dramatically changed). 
 160. Wilton, supra note 23, at 615. 
 161. See Walker, supra note 23, at 1121. 
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II. THE PROBLEMS WITH DEFENDANT-ORIENTED INJUNCTIONS 
Individual plaintiffs who challenge the validity of legal pro-
visions often seek Defendant-Oriented Injunctions completely 
prohibiting their enforcement, rather than Plaintiff-Oriented 
Injunctions that only bar the defendants from applying those 
provisions to the plaintiffs themselves. As discussed above, 
courts often are receptive to such requests.162 An invalid legal 
provision often applies in the same way to many people, and 
suffers from the same deficiency in most or all of those cases. In 
the words of Richard Nagareda, individual challenges to such 
provisions frequently involve “embedded aggregation,”163 be-
cause the court’s reasoning would apply equally to numerous 
people beyond just the plaintiff. 
Another reason that Defendant-Oriented Injunctions appeal 
to many courts is that a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction grants 
special legal protections only to the plaintiffs in the case. Alex-
andra Lahav explains that “[p]rocess equality . . . entitle[s] sim-
ilarly situated individuals to similar outcomes and, as a corol-
lary, reject[s] any process that results in unequal treatment of 
similarly situated litigants without explanation, because such a 
process appears arbitrary.”164 With a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunc-
tion, the individual plaintiffs who brought the suit are pro-
tected from the unconstitutional provision, but the government 
remains free to apply it to other, identically situated people.165 
                                                                                                        
 162. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 163. Richard Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1105, 1108, 1112 (2010) [hereinafter Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation]; Rich-
ard Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 149, 227 (2003) [hereinafter Nagareda, Preexistence Principle] 
(“[T]he generally applicable conduct to be enjoined or declared unlaw-
ful . . . make[s] interdependent the claims of would-be class members.”); Garrett, 
supra note 15, at 594, 647 (arguing that “[c]onstitutional rights and remedies are 
not just individual rights,” particularly with regard to voting rights); Carroll, su-
pra note 20, at 2019 (arguing that lawsuits have “an inherently aggregate dimen-
sion” where the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief “against a policy or practice that 
applies to a substantial number of persons on a generalized basis”). 
 164. Alexandra Lahav, Due Process and the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 545, 556 (2012); see also STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGA-
TION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 256 (1987) (noting that, in cases where plain-
tiffs seek certain kinds of injunctive relief, “the failure to provide for class treat-
ment could result either in contradiction or inconsistency”). 
 165. See Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral, supra note 30, at 2481–83 (explaining 
the importance of the distinction between actually being protected by an injunc-
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Leaving some rightholders unprotected also can lead to subse-
quent lawsuits, needlessly wasting judicial resources to re-liti-
gate the same issues and creating a risk of inconsistent verdicts 
from different courts.166 
On the other hand, issuance of a Defendant-Oriented Injunc-
tion in an individual-plaintiff lawsuit effectively turns the mat-
ter into a “‘de facto class action[],’”167 typically without ad-
dressing the numerous constitutional, procedural, practical, 
and policy considerations that such relief implicates. First, the 
plaintiffs usually lack standing to protect the rights of third 
parties, and particularly the rights of the public as a whole. 
Second, relatedly, Defendant-Oriented Injunctions may violate 
the due process rights of non-parties to the litigation. By seek-
ing a Defendant-Oriented Injunction, individual plaintiffs lev-
erage the rights of third parties who may not even be subject to 
the court’s personal jurisdiction, without their consent, in order 
to obtain more sweeping relief. Third, Defendant-Oriented In-
junctions have unfairly asymmetric preclusive effects. A suc-
cessful plaintiff can bind the government defendants regarding 
people who are not before the court. If the defendants prevail, 
in contrast, that judgment generally does not preclude subse-
quent actions, either in the same court or other jurisdictions, by 
third parties. 
Fourth, Defendant-Oriented Injunctions run contrary to the 
general rules governing judgments, and effectively provide 
class-wide relief despite the plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Thus, the policy considerations that 
underlie both the law of judgments and Rule 23 weigh strongly 
against Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in non-class cases. Fi-
nally, by issuing a Defendant-Oriented Injunction, a court ap-
plies its interpretation of the law to rightholders and claims 
                                                                                                        
tion, and merely having a substantial chance of obtaining one). These objections to 
Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions in non-class constitutional cases parallel the con-
cerns with underinclusive class definitions in class actions. See Nancy Morawetz, 
Underinclusive Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 402, 420 (1996) (“The principal harm 
caused by defining a class narrowly is the potential of denying similarly situated 
persons the same opportunity for relief for similar claims.”). 
 166. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 
507 (1987). 
 167. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation, supra note 163, at 1108 (quoting Taylor v. 
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008)). 
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outside the scope of its limited territorial jurisdiction, where its 
opinions lack precedential effect. 
The concerns set forth in this Part may be read in two differ-
ent lights. In their strongest form, they are reasons why courts 
should not grant Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in non-class 
cases. This Part instead may be read as identifying the various 
doctrines and rules that would have to be changed, or at least 
adequately addressed, in order to make Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions jurisdictionally, procedurally, and doctrinally per-
missible in non-class cases. At a minimum, courts should rec-
ognize the distinction between Plaintiff- and Defendant-Ori-
ented Injunctions, and avoid choosing between them on a 
largely ad hoc, subjective basis with little apparent attention to 
these issues. Part IV of this Article offers one possible approach 
that alleviates these concerns. 
A. Standing 
Perhaps the most fundamental problem with Defendant-Ori-
ented Injunctions, particularly in federal court, is that courts 
likely lack subject-matter jurisdiction to grant them. Federal 
courts are limited to adjudicating live “cases” and “controver-
sies.”168 This “case and controversy requirement,” among other 
things, allows federal courts to adjudicate only disputes in 
which the plaintiff has standing.169 
To have standing, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered 
injury-in-fact, that the defendant caused it, and—most im-
portantly from a remedial perspective—that the “injury will be 
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”170 As the redressability 
prong of this test implies, a plaintiff must have standing not 
                                                                                                        
 168. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 169. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). Elsewhere, I 
have argued that Article III’s case or controversy requirement also requires that 
the litigants actually be adverse to each other. Michael T. Morley, Consent of the 
Governed or Consent of the Government? The Problems of Consent Decrees in Govern-
ment-Defendant Cases, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 661–64, 666–68 (2014). Although 
the Supreme Court traditionally has characterized the “adverseness” requirement 
as an essential component of justiciability, see, e.g., Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 
How.) 251, 254–56 (1850), the majority in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2685–87 (2013), labeled it merely “prudential.” 
 170. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)). 
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only to assert a cause of action, but also to pursue each form of 
relief she seeks.171 
Although a plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief to 
protect her own rights,172 Article III does not permit federal 
courts to grant more expansive relief “cover[ing] additional 
actions that produce no concrete harm to the original plain-
tiff.”173 A plaintiff 
cannot sidestep Article III’s requirements by combining a 
request for injunctive relief for which he has standing with a 
request for injunctive relief for which he lacks standing. And 
for the same reason, a plaintiff cannot ask a court to expand 
an existing injunction unless he has standing to seek the ad-
ditional relief.174 
Thus, federal courts lack power to adjudicate requests for in-
junctive relief that would not prevent likely, impending, or on-
going harm to the plaintiff herself.175 
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions violate these constitutional 
standing limitations. Most constitutional rights—particularly in 
the election law context—are “divisible,”176 in that a court can 
grant meaningful, complete relief just for the plaintiff while 
leaving the status quo undisturbed for everyone else. When 
constitutional rights are divisible, a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunc-
tion requiring the government defendant to respect the plain-
tiff’s rights, or to refrain from enforcing a challenged legal pro-
vision against the plaintiff, redresses the harm the plaintiff 
                                                                                                        
 171. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2041 (2011) (“Plaintiffs must establish 
standing as to each form of relief they request . . . .”); accord Summers v. Earth 
Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652, 2662 (2013) (“To have standing, a litigant must seek relief for an injury that 
affects him in a ‘personal and individual way.’” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 
n.1)). 
 172. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 
(2000). 
 173. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 734 (2010). 
 174. Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107 (holding that 
relief that does not remedy the plaintiff’s injury “cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into 
federal court”); see also Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., 554 U.S. 269, 
303 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s emphasis on the party’s inju-
ry makes clear that the basis for rejecting standing in Steel Co. was the fact that the 
remedy sought would not benefit the party before the Court.”) (emphasis omit-
ted). 
 175. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 108–09; Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 
(1983). 
 176. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
No. 2] De Facto Class Actions 525 
faces.177 Once a court orders that a plaintiff’s rights be enforced, 
her claim is mooted.178 
A broader, Defendant-Oriented Injunction barring the gov-
ernment defendant from enforcing the law against others would 
not redress any harm to that plaintiff.179 A plaintiff lacks stand-
ing to seek such broader relief, and it would not be a proper ex-
ercise of a court’s Article III authority to grant it. Lujan’s redress-
ability requirement thus prevents a plaintiff from bootstrapping, 
based on the injury she has suffered to her own rights, to seek an 
injunction protecting the rights of others.180 
Of course, to grant complete relief to a plaintiff, a court 
sometimes must issue an order which winds up benefiting oth-
er people. For example, as discussed earlier, if a plaintiff 
demonstrates that legislative districts have been drawn uncon-
stitutionally, there is no way for the court to order a set of con-
stitutionally valid districts to be drawn for the plaintiff, while 
allowing the invalidated districts to remain in force for every-
one else.181 Apart from such cases involving “indivisible” 
rights, however, individual plaintiffs lack Article III standing to 
seek Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in non-class cases. 
A Defendant-Oriented Injunction cannot be analogized to a 
prophylactic injunction that attempts to prevent future viola-
tions of a plaintiff’s rights by prohibiting more conduct than is 
actually unconstitutional or illegal.182 A Defendant-Oriented 
Injunction enforces the rights of people other than the plaintiff, 
despite the absence of any additional marginal benefit con-
cerning the plaintiff’s rights. Although courts have broad eq-
                                                                                                        
 177. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also L.A. Haven Hospice, Inc. 
v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 665 (9th Cir. 2011) (“An order declaring the hospice cap 
regulation invalid, enjoining further enforcement against [the individual plaintiff], 
and requiring the Secretary to recalculate its liability in conformity with the hos-
pice cap statute, would have afforded the plaintiff complete relief. . . . [T]he na-
tionwide injunction must be vacated.”); Weber, supra note 16, at 361. 
 178. Carroll, supra note 20, at 2031. 
 179. See, e.g., Capograsso v. 30 River Ct. E. Urban Renewal Co., 482 F. App’x 
677, 681 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that a tenant’s attempt to seek relief “on behalf of 
the other former tenants is precisely the sort of claim that does not confer stand-
ing”). 
 180. See supra note 174. 
 181. See supra note 15. 
 182. Cf. supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
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uitable discretion in crafting the scope of injunctive relief,183 
Article III imposes outer bounds on the scope of that discretion. 
Relief that goes beyond redressing a plaintiff’s injuries is be-
yond the court’s authority. 
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions also exceed prudential lim-
itations on jus tertii standing.184 The general prudential prohibi-
tion on jus tertii standing provides that, “even when the plain-
tiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the ‘case or 
controversy’ requirement, . . . the plaintiff generally must assert 
his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to 
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”185 As the 
Supreme Court declared in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, “constitu-
tional rights are personal and may not be asserted vicari-
ously.”186 Because jus tertii is a prudential doctrine, the Court 
has crafted some exceptions, allowing individuals to sue to en-
force the rights of others in certain situations, such as where the 
plaintiff has a special relationship with those third parties187 or 
in First Amendment overbreadth cases.188 Even when a plaintiff 
may invoke the rights of third parties, however, Article III still 
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the relief she seeks 
will redress an injury to herself.189 
                                                                                                        
 183. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) 
(“[T]he scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is 
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”). 
 184. United Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Grp., 517 U.S. 544, 557 
(1996). 
 185. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 751 (1984) (“Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits 
on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a liti-
gant’s raising another person’s legal rights . . . .”). 
 186. 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973). 
 187. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115–16 (1976). 
 188. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980). 
Scholars have made the point that, in a fundamental rights case where the plain-
tiff contends that a statute is unconstitutional because it is insufficiently tailored, 
she is effectively asserting the rights of others. Dorf, supra note 10, at 265–66, 269, 
271. In such cases, the plaintiff need not show that the conduct in which she wish-
es to engage is constitutionally protected. Rather, she can argue that the law that 
bars her from performing those acts is invalid because it unnecessarily extends to 
other situations, interfering with the right of other people to engage in acts the 
government lacks a permissible basis for prohibiting. 
 189. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (holding that, even when jus tertii standing is permis-
sible as a prudential matter, the “core component” of standing doctrine “derived 
directly from the Constitution” requires the plaintiff to allege “personal injury 
fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be 
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Defendant-Oriented Injunctions are inconsistent with re-
strictions on jus tertii standing. Allowing individual plaintiffs 
to seek Defendant-Oriented Injunctions that completely pro-
hibit government defendants from enforcing challenged legal 
provisions enables them to assert the rights of third parties 
with whom they lack any special relationship. Such a preroga-
tive turns every individual plaintiff into a roving private attor-
ney general.190 As the Ninth Circuit held: 
[O]ur legal system does not automatically grant individual 
plaintiffs standing to act on behalf of all citizens similarly 
situated. A person who desires to be a “self-chosen repre-
sentative” and “volunteer champion,” must qualify under 
rule 23. To be sure, failure to grant class relief may leave a 
government official—temporarily—in a position to continue 
treating nonparties in a manner that would be prohibited 
with respect to named plaintiffs. But that is the nature of the 
relief.191 
Article III’s standing requirements therefore generally bar 
individual plaintiffs from seeking, and courts from granting, 
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in non-class cases. 
B. Due Process and Other Rightholders 
A second problem with Defendant-Oriented Injunctions is 
that they infringe the due process rights of the third parties 
whose underlying substantive rights the court is adjudicating 
and enforcing. When a plaintiff seeks a Defendant-Oriented 
Injunction, it is typically leveraging the rights of third parties 
who are not before the court to obtain an order that sweeps far 
more broadly than is necessary to enforce the plaintiff’s own 
rights.192 All alleged rightholders across the state or nation be-
                                                                                                        
redressed by the requested relief”); see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194 (1976) 
(confirming that the plaintiff had his own, independent Article III standing before 
permitting him to assert the rights of others through jus tertii standing). 
 190. Cf. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610–11 (“[U]nder our constitutional system courts 
are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Na-
tion’s laws.”). 
 191. Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 728 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949)). 
 192. Cf. Williams, supra note 15, at 604 (“Compelled adjudication of claims in a 
mandatory class proceeding deprives individuals of this right to exclude by al-
lowing their property (i.e., their legal claims) to be used by someone else (i.e., the 
class representatives and their attorneys) without their consent and for a purpose 
with which they may not agree.”). 
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come, in effect, members of an implied class, despite the fact 
that they have not been brought before the court, been notified 
about the case, or consented to such representation. Many of 
the rightholders may disagree with the plaintiff’s proffered in-
terpretation of the constitutional or other legal provisions at 
issue, or even support the statutes or regulations the plaintiff is 
challenging.193 
Indeed, it can be argued that many challenges to election-re-
lated laws involve a clash of constitutional rights.194 The right 
to vote is comprised of two complementary component rights: 
the “affirmative” right to cast a ballot, and the “defensive” 
right to have that ballot be counted and “given full value and 
effect, without being diluted or distorted by the casting of 
fraudulent” or otherwise invalid ballots.195 Many challenges to 
laws regulating the electoral process seek to vindicate the af-
firmative right to vote at the potential expense of the defensive 
right to vote. Voter identification statutes, proof-of-citizenship 
requirements, reductions in early voting periods, limits on ab-
sentee ballots, and other such regulations can make it more dif-
ficult for some people to vote, while helping ensure that legiti-
mate, properly cast votes are not diluted or nullified by invalid, 
improperly cast, or fraudulent votes. Many voters might rea-
sonably prefer to have election regulations in place to help pro-
tect their defensive right to vote, rather than have their af-
firmative right to vote asserted on their behalf. 
A Defendant-Oriented Injunction implicates the rights of 
non-plaintiff third parties in many ways. Most basically, such 
an order arguably violates their due process right to have a 
court perfect personal jurisdiction over them through service of 
                                                                                                        
 193. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976) (“Federal courts must 
hesitate before resolving a controversy . . . on the basis of the rights of third per-
sons not parties to the litigation,” in part because “the courts should not adjudi-
cate such rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of those 
rights . . . do not wish to assert them . . . .”); Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 1650 
(recognizing that rightholders may not support or wish to be part of a civil rights 
suit, and would “rather not have the case in court”); Maximilian A. Grant, Com-
ment, The Right Not to Sue: A First Amendment Rationale for Opting Out of Mandatory 
Class Actions, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 246 (1996) (“[W]here a class action seeks equi-
table relief in pursuit of political or ideological goals, class cohesion cannot be 
presumed.”); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 505–11 (1976). 
 194. Morley, State Constitutions, supra note 8, at 192–93. 
 195. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226 (1974). 
No. 2] De Facto Class Actions 529 
process before adjudicating and enforcing their constitutional 
or other legal entitlements.196 When a plaintiff initiates judicial 
proceedings, it invokes and thereby implicitly consents to the 
court’s personal jurisdiction.197 When a person becomes an in-
voluntary plaintiff through the actions of some other litigant, 
however, she should be entitled to the same service-of-process 
protections as a defendant.198 
Relatedly, Defendant-Oriented Injunctions may violate the 
due process rights of third parties by allowing a court to adju-
dicate and enforce their rights without first giving them notice 
and an opportunity to be heard or opt out.199 One might re-
spond that such third parties’ interests are “virtually repre-
sented” by the individual plaintiffs in the case, but the Su-
preme Court largely rejected the concept of virtual 
representation in Taylor v. Sturgell.200 
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions also might violate the sub-
stantive due process right of third parties to control their own 
causes of action. A legal claim that is recognized by federal or 
applicable state law—a chose in action—is a form of property 
protected by the Due Process Clause.201 As Ryan Williams ar-
                                                                                                        
 196. See Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1946); see also 
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 200. 553 U.S. 880, 884–85 (2008). 
 201. Weber, supra note 16, at 374–76 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 
U.S. 422 (1982)); Williams, supra note 15, at 619–21 (citing Tulsa Prof’l Collection 
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gues, an important component of such an entitlement is “the 
right to decide whether or not to sue” to enforce it.202 He explains, 
“Judicial recognition of . . . an autonomy-based right to seek 
vindication of one’s legal claims in court seems to strongly 
support the existence of a corollary autonomy-based right to 
refrain from asserting those claims as well.”203 A Defendant-
Oriented Injunction deprives rightholders of their constitution-
ally protected interest in deciding for themselves whether to 
assert and seek enforcement of their underlying rights. 
The Supreme Court held in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts 
that putative class members outside of a court’s territorial ju-
risdiction have a due process right to opt out of class actions 
seeking monetary damages.204 It left open the question of 
whether putative class members may claim a similar due pro-
cess right to opt out of suits for injunctive relief,205 but later 
noted the “serious possibility” that a denial of such opt-out 
rights would violate due process.206 Mark C. Weber agrees that 
Shutt’s reasoning carries over to the context of injunctions,207 
but some lower courts have rejected this conclusion.208 
Perhaps the most powerful response to these objections is 
that rightholders are already deprived of control over their 
causes of action, without notice or an opportunity to be heard, 
in the context of Rule 23(b)(2) lawsuits.209 A Defendant-Ori-
ented Injunction is a milder tool than a Rule 23(b)(2) lawsuit 
because it allows third parties to reap the benefits of a favora-
                                                                                                        
Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797, 807 (1985)). 
 202. Williams, supra note 15, at 623. 
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such as those seeking equitable relief.”). 
 206. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011). 
 207. Weber, supra note 16, at 385. 
 208. See, e.g., Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 183 F.R.D. 350, 355–56 (D. 
Conn. 1998); Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 6:93-CV-526, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11523, at *34 (E.D. Tex. July 27, 1995); Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 107 
F.R.D. 748, 749–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 209. See infra Part III.A. 
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ble ruling without subjecting them to the res judicata effects of 
an unfavorable one.210 On the other hand, commentators have 
also challenged the constitutionality of Rule 23(b)(2) on these 
very grounds,211 and the Supreme Court has not yet squarely 
addressed the issue.212 
Even if the concerns identified in this Section do not amount 
to due process violations, it still seems unfair and undesirable to 
allow an individual plaintiff to assert the claims of third parties 
who have not formally become part of the lawsuit, who have 
received no notice or chance to opt out of the proceedings, and 
who may affirmatively oppose the plaintiff’s lawsuit or request-
ed relief. Defendant-Oriented Injunctions allow plaintiffs to hi-
jack the rights of third parties, without their knowledge or con-
sent and potentially against their will, for the purpose of 
obtaining broader relief than is necessary to enforce those plain-
tiffs’ rights. Such measures undermine the autonomy interests of 
rightholders over their own supposed entitlements. 
Alternatively, Rule 23(b)(2) already creates a mechanism 
through which an individual plaintiff can bring the claims of 
other, similarly situated rightholders before the court. The 
availability of this alternative counsels against allowing courts 
to grant broad, Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in cases solely 
involving individual plaintiffs, where a Rule 23(b)(2) class has 
not been certified.213 
C. Asymmetric Preclusion 
A third concern about Defendant-Oriented Injunctions is that 
they violate the principle of “preclusive symmetry.”214 Preclu-
                                                                                                        
 210. See infra Part II.C. 
 211. Williams, supra note 15, at 623, 629; Weber, supra note 16, at 401 (arguing 
that members of a Rule 23(b)(2) class should be subject to res judicata only if they 
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 212. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 213. See infra Part II.D, Part III.A. 
 214. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation, supra note 163, at 1113; see Carroll, supra 
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sive symmetry exists when a lawsuit will have the same res 
judicata effect on both plaintiffs and defendants. Richard Na-
gareda explains that a plaintiff “ought not to be positioned to 
wield the bargaining leverage of a class-wide trial without, at 
the same time, affording to the defendant the assurance of a 
commensurately binding victory were the defendant, rather 
than the plaintiff class, to prevail on the merits.”215 
When a court is willing to grant a Defendant-Oriented In-
junction, res judicata applies asymmetrically to the plaintiffs 
and defendants. If an individual plaintiff prevails, the court 
will impose a broad Defendant-Oriented Injunction, barring 
the government defendant from enforcing the challenged legal 
provision against anyone. In other words, a victory from any 
individual plaintiff binds the government defendant with re-
gard to all other rightholders, and prevents that defendant, its 
privies, or agents216 from relitigating the issue against other 
rightholders. 
Conversely, if an individual plaintiff loses, res judicata does 
not preclude other rightholders from raising identical chal-
lenges to the same legal provision,217 perhaps with different 
adjudicative or legislative facts, or in different courts or before 
a different judge.218 Thus, third-party rightholders stand to 
benefit from a ruling in favor of the individual plaintiff, but 
face no consequences from an adverse ruling if the individual 
plaintiff loses. The Civil Rules Advisory Committee amended 
Rule 23 in 1966 to abolish “spurious” class actions specifically 
to eliminate such asymmetric preclusion.219 The fairness con-
cerns underlying the principle of preclusive symmetry thus 
counsel against Defendant-Oriented Injunctions. 
                                                                                                        
 215. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation, supra note 163, at 1113. 
 216. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2). 
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It might be objected that, although other rightholders may 
not be formally bound by res judicata or collateral estoppel, an 
adverse ruling in an earlier case still will limit future suits as a 
matter of stare decisis. Trial court rulings, however, are not 
precedential and have no stare decisis effect, even within the 
same jurisdiction.220 Even an intermediate appellate court rul-
ing, in systems such as the federal judiciary that are divided 
regionally, is not binding outside of the court’s territorial juris-
diction. Thus, most rulings in individual-plaintiff cases will not 
bar subsequent litigants from raising the same claims as a mat-
ter of stare decisis. 
It also might be objected that asymmetric preclusion is not 
problematic or unfair.221 Jeremy Bentham himself rejected a 
mutuality requirement for claim preclusion.222 The Supreme 
Court authorized non-mutual defensive collateral estoppel in 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Founda-
tion,223 and non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel (at least 
against private parties) in Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore.224 
Whatever the merits of those rulings in the context of purely 
private disputes, the Court held in United States v. Mendoza that 
the government generally should not be subject to non-mutual 
offensive collateral estoppel.225 It explained that permitting 
non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel against the Govern-
ment “would substantially thwart the development of im-
portant questions of law by freezing the first final decision ren-
dered on a particular legal issue.”226 It also would “force the 
Solicitor General . . . to appeal every adverse decision in order 
to avoid foreclosing further review.”227 Many subsequent cir-
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 221. Weber, supra note 16, at 404; see also Robert von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 
38 YALE L.J. 299, 303 (1929). 
 222. 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 579 (1827). 
 223. 402 U.S. 313, 322–25, 327–30, 350 (1971) (discussing opposition to mutuality 
requirement for res judicata). 
 224. 439 U.S. 322, 329–33 (1979) (explaining why mutuality should not be re-
quired for offensive collateral estoppel). 
 225. 464 U.S. 154, 158–62 (1984). Mendoza thus precludes plaintiffs suing the 
government from invoking Parklane Hosiery. 
 226. Id. at 158. 
 227. Id. at 161. 
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cuit courts later applied this ruling to state litigants, as well,228 
although not to municipalities.229 
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions are contrary to Mendoza. An 
injunction completely barring a government defendant from 
enforcing a challenged legal provision “freez[es] the first final 
decision rendered” on the issue.230 Moreover, it effectively com-
pels the government defendant to appeal, rather than waiting 
for a more favorable fact pattern or allowing the law to perco-
late through various courts.231 Indeed, a Defendant-Oriented 
Injunction is an even stronger remedy than non-mutual offen-
sive collateral estoppel, because it takes effect without another 
rightholder having to file a subsequent lawsuit. The same rea-
sons that led the Mendoza Court to bar plaintiffs from asserting 
non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel against government 
defendants apply with even greater force to preclude them 
from seeking Defendant-Oriented Injunctions. 
D. The Law of Judgments and Rule 23 
Yet another concern about the issuance of Defendant-Ori-
ented Injunctions in individual-plaintiff cases is that they un-
dermine the policy concerns that drive the law of judgments 
and Rule 23. In general, judgments settle the legal rights and 
obligations of the parties to a case against each other, and do 
not extend to third parties who are not before the court.232 The 
Court applied a variation of this principle in the punitive dam-
ages context in Philip Morris USA v. Williams: “[T]he Constitu-
tion’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive 
damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts 
upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., 
injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers 
to the litigation.”233 
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Rule 23 provides an exception to this principle, allowing one 
party to litigate on behalf of a class of rightholders when, 
among other things, a court determines that the rule’s numer-
osity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation 
requirements are satisfied.234 By issuing a Defendant-Oriented 
Injunction in a non-class case, a court effectively grants class-
wide relief without determining whether Rule 23’s require-
ments are satisfied, thereby circumventing and undermining 
Rule 23.235 
As discussed in the previous Section, Defendant-Oriented In-
junctions also allow rightholders to potentially reap the benefit 
of a favorable ruling without subjecting them to the res judicata 
effect of an unfavorable ruling. Rule 23 was amended in 1966 to 
eliminate the possibility of such asymmetric claim preclusion 
by eliminating “spurious” class actions.236 Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions are therefore contrary to the policies underlying 
Rule 23. 
E. Geographic Limitations of Lower Courts 
A final difficulty with Defendant-Oriented Injunctions is that 
they allow a court to give legal effect to its rulings beyond the 
scope of its territorial jurisdiction. When a court decides a case, 
it may issue two different types of documents: a judgment, 
which only specifies the ultimate outcome,237 and a written 
opinion, which explains the legal reasoning that led to the 
judgment. The judgment, by definition, has what can be called 
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“adjudicative effects”: it resolves the dispute between the par-
ties and specifies their respective legal rights and obligations 
toward each other. A judgment is generally binding and en-
forceable anywhere; its effects are national, and potentially 
even global, in scope. A monetary judgment can typically be 
domesticated in any state and executed through levies and 
garnishment, as permitted by state law.238 Similarly, a defend-
ant may be enjoined from violating a law anywhere in the state 
or nation.239 The res judicata and collateral estoppel effects of a 
valid judgment also generally apply in all state and federal 
courts throughout the nation. Thus, in a variety of ways, the 
adjudicative effects of a court’s ruling—in other words, the ef-
fects of the judgment itself—can reverberate far beyond the 
county or judicial district in which the court exercises territorial 
jurisdiction. 
The effects of the written opinion accompanying the judg-
ment, if any, are far more limited. An opinion has what may be 
called “expositive effects”: the resolution of legal issues neces-
sary to reach the judgment.240 Stare decisis determines the ex-
tent of an opinion’s expositive effects. Federal district court 
opinions generally lack any stare decisis effect. Future courts, 
even within the same district, are not bound by such opinions, 
and they generally cannot make the law “clearly established” 
for purposes of overcoming qualified immunity.241 An inter-
mediate appellate court ruling is binding, and can make the 
law “clearly established,” only within that court’s territorial 
jurisdiction. The ruling has no such effect, and is of purely per-
suasive value, outside that jurisdiction. 
In most cases, a court may resolve a dispute between indi-
vidual plaintiffs and government defendants without affecting 
or enforcing anyone else’s rights. The court may enjoin the de-
fendant from applying a challenged legal provision to the 
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plaintiffs, for example, by allowing them to remain on the voter 
registration rolls, vote early, vote without showing identifica-
tion, have their facially invalid ballots be counted, or be ex-
cused from some other statutory or regulatory requirement. 
Although fairness or other constitutional concerns may arise, it 
is indisputably possible to extend such entitlements to individ-
ual plaintiffs without doing so for the rest of the electorate.242 
When a trial or appellate court nevertheless enters a Defend-
ant-Oriented Injunction, it is effectively giving its legal opinion 
the force of law on a statewide or nationwide basis, beyond 
where its opinions have any expositive effect. The court is 
preemptively resolving potential disputes between the gov-
ernment defendants and other rightholders who are not before 
the court, including those living in other counties or judicial 
districts, concerning events, transactions, or conduct outside 
the court’s territorial jurisdiction.243 
Such “extraterritorial” application of legal determinations 
happens, of course, in statewide or nationwide class actions. 
Even though a court’s territorial jurisdiction is limited, it has 
the power to certify classes to include putative members out-
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side that jurisdiction when Rule 23’s requirements are met.244 
The Supreme Court has held, however, that it is generally 
“preferable” for district courts to refrain from certifying classes 
that extend beyond their geographic limits.245 
Limiting the breadth of lower courts’ injunctions comple-
ments Mendoza’s prohibition on non-mutual offensive collateral 
estoppel against government defendants. Both doctrines seek 
to restrict the expositive effects of a lower court’s ruling to 
leave other courts, particularly those in other geographic re-
gions, free to address issues de novo and potentially arrive at 
contrary conclusions. Broad statewide or nationwide Defend-
ant-Oriented Injunctions preclude such multiple adjudications 
from occurring. Thus, Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions ensure that 
the expositive effects of lower courts’ rulings remain confined 
to the issuing court’s territorial jurisdiction. 
III. SOME POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
When a court attempts to determine the proper scope of in-
junctive relief in a constitutional case, it faces a conflict between 
two imperatives. On the one hand, the court is exercising its 
role as an expositor of the law, applying substantive constitu-
tional principles to conclude that a statute or regulation is in-
valid.246 On the other hand, it must act within the confines of 
the particular case or controversy before it. The court is subject 
to a wide range of jurisdictional and policy-based limitations, 
and must also consider geographic constraints on the scope of 
its authority to impose a particular interpretation of the law.247 
This Part explores some potential mechanisms for resolving 
such conflicts. 
Section A begins by explaining how class actions under Rule 
23(b)(2)248 avoid raising many of the concerns with Defendant-
Oriented Injunctions identified in Part II. This Article ulti-
mately recommends that Rule 23(b)(2) be integrated into a 
comprehensive framework for addressing the proper scope of 
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relief in individual-plaintiff, non-class cases.249 On its own, 
however, the rule is insufficient to resolve remedial concerns in 
such cases.  
Section B explores the remedies available in non-class law-
suits brought by institutional plaintiffs. When an entity relies 
on associational standing,250 it is simply standing in for its 
members who are adversely affected by the challenged provi-
sion. A suit based on associational standing is, in effect, a suit 
brought on behalf of a substantial number of individual plain-
tiffs (that is, all of the organization’s members who are affected 
by the challenged provision), but does not include all 
rightholders within the jurisdiction. Thus, associational stand-
ing neither avoids nor resolves the fundamental challenges 
raised by individual-plaintiff cases. 
When an entity asserts organizational standing,251 in contrast, 
it may seek a Defendant-Oriented Injunction completely bar-
ring enforcement of a legal provision. The gravamen of such a 
suit is that enforcement of the challenged provision against any 
members of the public harms the organization itself by inter-
fering with the organization’s mission—which is typically ide-
ological or policy-related—and requiring the diversion of the 
organization’s resources. Current doctrine greatly limits the 
ability of entities to assert organizational standing, however. 
Moreover, that alternative will be unavailable in cases where 
no appropriate organization exists or wishes to challenge a par-
ticular provision. Additionally, the concept of organizational 
standing fits somewhat uncomfortably with Article III’s limita-
tions on standing. 
Section C discusses the possibility of centralizing adjudica-
tion of election-related disputes in a particular court. Such 
“unity of forum” proposals,252 which already are included in 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act253 and the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act,254 would eliminate concerns stemming from 
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geographic limits on the scope of a lower court’s power.255 Such 
an approach is vulnerable to the objections typically raised 
against specialized courts, however, and provides no assistance 
in resolving public law disputes that fall outside the jurisdic-
tion of any such court. 
Finally, Section D examines the possibility that Equal Protec-
tion principles might require courts to issue broad Defendant-
Oriented Injunctions that protect all rightholders equally as the 
remedy for constitutional rights violations. 
A. Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions 
Class actions seeking classwide injunctive relief are one ob-
vious means of avoiding both the deficiencies of Plaintiff-Ori-
ented Injunctions and the concerns about Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions that arise in cases brought by individual plain-
tiffs.256 One of the main objections to Plaintiff-Oriented Injunc-
tions is that they underenforce rights by allowing government 
defendants to continue enforcing invalidated legal provisions 
against non-parties. Class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) alleviate 
this concern. 
Rule 23(b)(2) allows a court to certify a class if Rule 23(a)’s 
general requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequacy of representation are satisfied,257 and the defend-
ant has acted or refused to act “on grounds that apply gener-
ally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a 
whole.”258 Unlike with most other types of class actions, puta-
tive class members are not entitled to receive notice of the suit 
or an opportunity to opt out before the class is certified.259  
Rule 23(b)(2) was crafted specifically to facilitate civil rights 
litigation.260 It allows rights to be enforced on an “aggregate” 
                                                                                                        
 255. See supra Part II.E. 
 256. See generally Carroll, supra note 20 (advocating Rule 23(b)(2) class actions as 
a means of resolving remedial issues in suits for injunctive relief). 
 257. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 258. Id. R. 23(b)(2). 
 259. Id. R. 23(c)(2)(A) (specifying that the court has discretion over whether to 
order pre-certification notice to putative members of proposed classes under Rule 
23(b)(2)). 
 260. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Advisory Committee’s Note (1966), available at 39 F.R.D. 
73, 102; Garrett, supra note 15, at 603, 608–09; Carroll, supra note 20, at 2025. 
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basis by permitting all rightholders to be included as part of 
the plaintiff class.261 Thus, all similarly situated people stand to 
benefit equally from a favorable ruling, preventing disparities 
in the enforcement of rights.262 
The breadth of the plaintiff class in a Rule 23(b)(2) case 
makes a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction effectively equivalent to a 
Defendant-Oriented one. Many of the concerns about Defend-
ant-Oriented Injunctions263 are therefore alleviated. All 
rightholders in the class are bound by the outcome of the suit264 
whereas, in an individual suit, no one other than the plaintiff is 
precluded from bringing a subsequent challenge.265 Thus, class-
based challenges to the validity of laws and regulations pre-
vent individual plaintiffs from bringing a succession of law-
suits against a legal provision until they inevitably find a fa-
vorable judge who might be willing to make factual findings 
and legal determinations in their favor. 
                                                                                                        
 261. Garrett, supra note 15, at 598; see also Nagareda, Preexistence Principle, supra 
note 163, at 232 (advocating the use of class actions for injunctive relief where “it 
is not possible to ascertain the legality of the defendant’s conduct as to one affect-
ed claimant without necessarily doing so as to all others”). 
 262. Carroll, supra note 20, at 2022 (“Class treatment pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) 
increases the likelihood that a court will issue a final decision on the merits that 
reaches system-wide . . . through a process designed to protect the interests of all 
those affected.”); Lahav, supra note 164, at 557 (“[T]he class action furthers equali-
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same side.”); Garrett, supra note 15, at 613 (arguing that Rule 23(b)(2) civil rights 
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“inconsistent verdicts”); Tenny, supra note 23, at 1019, 1034–35 (advocating Rule 
23(b)(2) class actions so that people affected by an invalidated legal provision 
need not institute independent lawsuits to prevent its enforcement); cf. Slack, su-
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certain cases, but does not explain why courts should issue them without first 
certifying Rule 23(b)(2) classes. Walker, supra note 23, at 1149–51. 
 263. See supra Part II. 
 264. Wilton, supra note 23, at 598 & n.7, 622–23; Garrett, supra note 15, at 597, 
613; Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation, supra note 163, at 1139–40; see also Tenny, 
supra note 23, at 1022–23; Walker, supra note 23, at 1136, 1150–51; Weber, supra 
note 16, at 367–68; see, e.g., Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984); 
Bell v. Bd. of Educ., 683 F.2d 963, 966–67 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that collateral 
estoppel precluded a new civil rights claim based on conduct previously adjudi-
cated in an earlier class-action suit); Cotton v. Hutto, 577 F.2d 453, 454–55 (8th Cir. 
1978) (same). 
 265. Wilton, supra note 23, at 598 n.7, 622–23; see also Garrett, supra note 15, at 
613 (noting that Rule 23(b)(2) class actions against government defendants allow 
them to avoid piecemeal litigation). 
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In Califano v. Yamasaki, the Supreme Court held that district 
courts considering challenges to federal legal provisions may 
certify nationwide classes.266 It emphasized that, when a court 
certifies an injunction-only class under Rule 23(b)(2), the limits 
restricting damages class actions under Rule 23(b)(3)267 are in-
applicable.268 At least one circuit has held that Califano author-
izes certification of class actions that include not only all people 
subject to a legal provision, but also anyone who might be sub-
ject to it in the future.269 The Califano Court recognized that na-
tionwide class actions prevent issues from percolating through 
the lower courts and may foreclose courts in different parts of 
the country from reaching different conclusions.270 It concluded 
that such considerations should not preclude nationwide class 
actions, but rather counsel district courts to be cautious in certi-
fying them.271 
Despite the appeal of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, as currently 
crafted they cannot completely resolve problems concerning 
the proper remedy in lawsuits challenging the validity of legal 
provisions. First, most basically, plaintiffs are not required to 
bring suits as class actions. Even when a plaintiff’s claim in-
volves embedded aggregation, in the sense that many people’s 
rights are allegedly being violated in the same way by the same 
legal provision, a plaintiff may choose to bring an individual 
suit to enforce only his own rights without seeking class certifi-
cation.272 Second, a court cannot certify a class under Rule 
                                                                                                        
 266. 442 U.S. 682, 702–03 (1979). 
 267. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (providing that a district court may certify a class for 
damages if a class action “is superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy”); cf. Christine P. Bartholomew, The Failed 
Superiority Experiment, 69 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2746202 
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 268. Califano, 442 U.S. at 702. But see Slack, supra note 23, at 944, 968, 977–78, 987 
(arguing against nationwide injunctions on the grounds that they interfere with 
the natural development of the law, as well as dialogue between the political 
branches and judiciary); Walker, supra note 23, at 1121 (arguing that nationwide 
injunctions against government defendants seem “legislative”). 
 269. Tataranowicz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268, 272–73 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (affirming 
“the practice of defining classes to include persons who in the future fit the class 
criteria”). 
 270. Califano, 442 U.S. at 702. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Newberg on Class Actions contends that, “[i]n rare cases, [a] defendant may 
move for certification of a plaintiff class.” WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON 
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23(b)(2) unless the class satisfies all of Rule 23(a)’s require-
ments. In some cases, plaintiffs may have trouble meeting that 
standard, particularly if the court finds the nature of the plain-
tiffs’ challenge to be fact-specific.273 
Third, as currently crafted, Rule 23(b)(2) classes are problem-
atic because members of putative classes are not entitled to no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard before the class is certified 
or the case is adjudicated on the merits. In other words, under 
Rule 23 as currently drafted, class members may be bound by a 
judgment in a case about which they were never informed, and 
from which they never had an opportunity to opt out.274 Fair-
ness concerns counsel against allowing people’s legal rights 
and claims to be involuntarily extinguished by a class action 
that they did not know about and from which they were una-
ble to extricate themselves.275 Weber points out, however, that 
due process might not require notice and an opportunity to opt 
out of Rule 23(b)(2) lawsuits, because the cost and burden of 
such measures could be prohibitive, undermining the ability of 
most putative class representatives to invoke Rule 23(b)(2) at 
all.276 Thus, while courts’ remedial decisions are much easier in 
cases where a plaintiff class is certified under Rule 23(b)(2), that 
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 276. Weber, supra note 16, at 394; cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
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quires that class members have the power to opt out of injunction-only class-
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prohibited when a plaintiff seeks classwide injunctive relief, because a defend-
ant’s interest in being able to rely on a favorable ruling outweighs putative class 
members’ interest in “sit[ting] on the sidelines” of the lawsuit without being sub-
ject to adverse res judicata effects. Nagareda, Preexistence Principle, supra note 163, 
at 232–33. 
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rule does not enable courts to avoid the difficulties involved in 
determining the proper scope of relief in non-class, individual-
plaintiff cases. 
B. Organizational Standing 
Distinctions between Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented In-
junctions also are minimized in cases where a civil rights or 
other similar group asserts its own organizational standing to 
seek broad injunctive relief against any enforcement or appli-
cation of an allegedly invalid legal provision.277 When an or-
ganization demonstrates that enforcement of a law against any 
members of the public directly harms its own institutional in-
terests, it may seek an injunction barring the government de-
fendants from enforcing it against anyone. Thus, as with Rule 
23(b)(2) class actions, a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction effectively 
becomes a Defendant-Oriented Injunction, without violating 
many of the restrictions discussed in Part II. 
Organizational standing must be distinguished from the 
closely related concept of associational standing. When a group 
asserts associational standing, it is essentially standing in for 
one or more of its members, asserting their rights on their be-
half.278 When an association’s standing rests on this basis, a 
Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction running in favor of the association 
bars the government defendant from enforcing the challenged 
legal provision against any of the association’s members. Such 
an injunction is effectively equivalent to the Plaintiff-Oriented 
Injunction the court could have issued if the members them-
selves had been named as individual plaintiffs in the case.279 It 
leaves the government defendant free to continue enforcing the 
law against non-members. Bringing a suit based on associa-
tional standing therefore does not change the analysis in Part II 
                                                                                                        
 277. Garrett, supra note 15, at 638. 
 278. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009); see also Hunt v. 
Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343–44 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 
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concerning the choice between Plaintiff- and Defendant-Ori-
ented Injunctions. Courts still must decide whether to enjoin 
enforcement of the challenged provision against only the plain-
tiff association’s members, or instead against all similarly situ-
ated rightholders. 
With organizational standing, in contrast, a group sues to as-
sert its own institutional interests. Havens Realty Corp. v. Cole-
man is the quintessential example of this theory in action.280 In 
Havens Realty, a group called Housing Opportunities Made 
Equal (“HOME”) sought damages from the defendant landlord 
for violating the Fair Housing Act of 1968281 by discriminating 
against blacks seeking to rent apartments.282 HOME alleged 
that its purpose was to “assist equal access to housing through 
counseling and other referral services.”283 Because of the de-
fendant’s illegal conduct, HOME “had to devote significant re-
sources to identify and counteract the defendant’s racially dis-
criminatory steering practices.”284 
The Supreme Court affirmed HOME’s standing, explaining: 
If, as broadly alleged, petitioners’ steering practices have 
perceptibly impaired HOME’s ability to provide counseling 
and referral services for low- and moderate-income home-
seekers, there can be no question that the organization has 
suffered injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable in-
jury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent 
drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more 
than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social in-
terests.285 
Thus, an organization that engages in voter education and 
outreach, voter registration drives, or get-out-the-vote cam-
paigns may have organizational standing to challenge certain 
types of election-related provisions. Such a group can argue 
that some allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise invalid 
measures compel it to devote additional resources to achieving 
                                                                                                        
 280. 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). 
 281. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976). 
 282. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 367, 379. 
 283. Id. at 379. 
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its goals.286 A complete prohibition on enforcement of the chal-
lenged provision—effectively, a Defendant-Oriented Injunc-
tion—is the only way of completely protecting the group’s or-
ganizational interests. 
The possibility of organizational standing is insufficient, 
however, to alleviate remedial difficulties in non-class cases. 
First, the concept has come under heavy scrutiny, and courts 
have frequently rejected attempts to assert such standing, in-
cluding in election law cases.287 The Supreme Court itself has 
emphasized that a group’s mere ideological opposition to a le-
gal provision or desire to promote the public interest is insuffi-
cient to give it organizational standing.288  
Second, fairness concerns may arise in allowing groups to seek 
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions (or Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions 
that are so broad that they effectively serve as Defendant-
Oriented Injunctions) when individual plaintiffs—including actu-
al rightholders—raising the same claims would be unable to ob-
tain such relief. Third, perhaps most importantly, individual 
plaintiffs may challenge the validity of legal provisions without 
including an entity as a plaintiff. Even when a group is included 
as a plaintiff, it often will be able to assert only associational, ra-
ther than organizational, standing. Thus, the concept of organiza-
tional standing cannot resolve difficulties concerning the proper 
scope of relief in individual-plaintiff cases. 
C. Unity of Forum Proposals 
Richard Nagareda points out that “unity of forum” pro-
posals are another way of addressing embedded aggregation.289 
Congress or a state could designate a certain trial court to hear 
cases of a certain nature (such as constitutional claims in gen-
eral, or election-related claims specifically), or require that a 
single appellate court hear all appeals from such cases. The Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act, for example, contains a special 
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judicial review provision specifying that any constitutional 
challenges must be filed in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia and adjudicated by a three-judge panel, with 
direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.290 Similarly, the Fed-
eral Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases from 
any district court in the country.291 
If certain types of cases were consolidated before a single 
court, particularly at the appellate level, the significance of the 
distinction between Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunc-
tions would largely evaporate. When a specialized appellate 
court affirms a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction, its opinion would 
be binding as a matter of stare decisis in all future cases (since 
it would be the only court authorized to hear cases of that na-
ture). While an injunction provides stronger protection for 
rights than a mere judicial opinion,292 the government defend-
ant would risk violating clearly established law and face a se-
ries of lawsuits it was virtually guaranteed to lose (with the 
prospect of liability for attorneys’ fees293) if it persisted in ignor-
ing the ruling. 
This approach is subject to the standard objections against 
specialized courts. In particular, if a single court had jurisdic-
tion over all cases or appeals dealing with constitutional issues 
in general, or election law disputes in particular, it increases 
the likelihood that partisans would be nominated or rejected 
for the court based primarily on their views on those particular 
types of cases.294 Because generalist courts, by definition, adju-
dicate a wide range of issues, judges are unlikely to be ap-
pointed to them based on their views on a single type of case or 
even range of cases. Judges on a specialist court also might 
tend to have more extreme views on issues within their juris-
diction than generalist judges, precisely because they specialize 
in that area.295 The substantive and political problems posed by 
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vesting responsibility for all constitutional or election law cases 
in a particular court seem to far outweigh whatever benefits 
such an arrangement might offer at the remedial stage of liti-
gation. 
D. Equal Protection Approach 
One final approach would be to claim that, once a plaintiff 
has demonstrated that a legal provision is unconstitutional, ei-
ther facially or as applied under certain circumstances, the 
court must issue a Defendant-Oriented Injunction to avoid cre-
ating Equal Protection problems.296 Under this view, prohibit-
ing a government defendant from enforcing a law against an 
individual plaintiff on the grounds that it violates her constitu-
tional rights, while allowing it to continue enforcing the same 
provision against other people (particularly other people with-
in the court’s geographic jurisdiction), would constitute arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement of constitutional rights. 
Once a constitutional violation has been established, there is no 
basis for discriminating among rightholders by limiting an in-
junction only to the individual plaintiffs in a case. 
If Equal Protection principles were as robust as this approach 
suggests, the class action mechanism would be wholly unnec-
essary in constitutional cases. An individual plaintiff could liti-
gate her own rights, and the Equal Protection Clause would 
require the court to issue injunctive relief in favor of all 
rightholders throughout the court’s geographic jurisdiction, or 
perhaps even in the state or nation. This approach effectively 
advocates that substantive constitutional law should trump 
procedural, jurisdictional, and other conventional restrictions 
on litigation, at least at the remedial stage.  
District court rulings do not give rise to binding precedents, 
however, even within the same jurisdiction. The only real func-
tion of a district court ruling is to adjudicate the claims and de-
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fenses of the litigants in the case before it. It seems odd to con-
tend that, by granting a particular plaintiff relief, even in a con-
stitutional case, a court thereby violates the Equal Protection 
rights of other rightholders not before the court. As Tom Merrill 
asks rhetorically, “X (whether rich or poor) had to sue the gov-
ernment to win, and now Y (whether rich or poor) also has to 
sue the government to win. In what respect are they being treat-
ed differently?”297 Thus, while the Equal Protection approach 
seems facially compelling, it likely fails precisely because it ig-
nores the restrictions imposed by the posture of the case in 
which the court articulated or enforced the substantive right.  
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
This Part presents a new approach for determining the prop-
er scope of injunctive relief in non-class, individual-plaintiff 
cases where a court determines that a legal provision is un-
constitutional, invalid, or otherwise unenforceable. Section A 
explains the proposed two-step standard. A court should begin 
by assessing whether Equal Protection principles prohibit it 
from issuing a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction that protects only 
the rights of the individual plaintiffs in the case. Assuming that 
a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction would be a constitutionally val-
id remedy—which it usually should be—the court should go 
on to apply traditional severability principles to determine 
whether to issue a Plaintiff- or Defendant-Oriented Injunction. 
In other words, the court should assess whether the legal pro-
vision’s invalid applications against the individual plaintiffs 
may be “severed” from its application to third parties not be-
fore the court. 
Section B contends that a court can alleviate most of the ob-
jections that Part II of this Article raises against Defendant-Ori-
ented Injunctions by conducting this two-step analysis at the 
outset of the case. If the court determines that a Defendant-Ori-
ented Injunction is the proper remedy, as a result of either Equal 
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Protection principles or its severability analysis, it should require 
the plaintiffs to proceed with the case, if at all, as a Rule 23(b)(2) 
class action. If, on the other hand, the court determines that a 
Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction is the proper remedy, then the case 
may proceed on a non-class basis. This Section concludes by of-
fering additional recommendations to protect the rights of 
members of Rule 23(b)(2) classes certified under this framework. 
A. Choosing Between Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions 
In a non-class, individual-plaintiff case, when a court deter-
mines that a legal provision is unconstitutional, invalid, or oth-
erwise unenforceable (either facially or as applied), and justici-
ability and other such requirements are satisfied, the plaintiffs 
generally are entitled, at a minimum, to a Plaintiff-Oriented 
Injunction barring the government defendants from enforcing 
the provision against them. At that point, the trial court, at the 
very least, must modify the statutory or regulatory scheme by 
essentially carving out an exception to the challenged provision 
to prevent its application to the plaintiffs. The question then 
arises whether the court should go further by issuing a De-
fendant-Oriented Injunction to prohibit the government de-
fendants from enforcing the legal provision against other peo-
ple, as well. The court should resolve this issue through a two-
step analysis, applying constitutional law and traditional sev-
erability principles. 
First, the court must determine whether granting the re-
quested relief solely to the individual plaintiffs would violate 
Equal Protection principles by authorizing disparate enforce-
ment of fundamental rights.298 Such potential Equal Protection 
concerns likely would arise only in cases where the court held a 
legal provision unconstitutional, rather than invalid on statu-
tory grounds. As discussed above, some scholars have rejected 
the notion that granting injunctive relief only to individual 
plaintiffs who have requested it would violate Equal Protection 
principles.299 Under their view, Equal Protection principles sel-
dom, if ever, require a court to issue Defendant-Oriented In-
junctions. A person who has filed a lawsuit to enforce his or 
her rights, by definition, cannot be deemed similarly situated 
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with a person who has not done so.300 That interpretation seems 
to be the most accurate understanding of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Courts and other commentators, however, reasonably 
might take a different view. If the court concludes that granting 
only a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction would be unconstitutional, 
then it necessarily must grant a Defendant-Oriented Injunction. 
Second, assuming that Equal Protection principles do not 
compel the court to issue a Defendant-Oriented Injunction, the 
court should determine whether the challenged legal provision 
itself requires such relief by applying traditional severability 
principles. Severability questions arise when a court deter-
mines that a particular provision of a statute or regulation is 
invalid, and it must decide whether the remainder is still en-
forceable. Generally, a court severs the invalid provision and 
continues to enforce the remaining sections unless: (i) the re-
maining sections cannot operate coherently as a law, or (ii) the 
court concludes that the entity that enacted the statute or reg-
ulation would not have intended for its remaining sections to 
be enforced without the invalidated portions.301 Courts should 
apply a variation of this approach in determining the proper 
scope of injunctive relief in individual-plaintiff cases.302  
First, the court should determine whether the provision could 
function coherently without being applied to the plaintiffs in the 
case. The answer, in many cases, is that the law would remain 
functional. For example, although some fairness issues might 
arise, procedural requirements for voting and campaign finance 
restrictions could be applied coherently even if a few people 
were exempted from them. For certain types of provisions, in 
contrast, such as legislative redistricting, it would be incoherent 
and impossible to grant relief solely to individual plaintiffs 
without likewise extending it to everyone else. 
                                                                                                        
 300. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 660 (1981) 
(“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment . . . introduced the constitutional requirement of 
equal protection, prohibiting the States from acting arbitrarily or treating similarly 
situated persons differently . . . .”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike.”). 
 301. See supra note 25. 
 302. Cf. Dorf, supra note 10, at 265 (discussing severability analysis for determin-
ing whether a statute should be held facially unconstitutional, or instead unconsti-
tutional as applied). 
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Second, the court should consider whether the entity that 
promulgated the challenged provision—that is, Congress, a 
state legislature, or an administrative agency—still would have 
enacted the provision if it knew that the individual plaintiffs 
would have to be exempted from it. In many cases, a legisla-
ture or agency would want a provision to be applied as broadly 
as possible, even if some people must be exempt from it, at 
least until a state supreme court or the U.S. Supreme Court fi-
nally adjudicates its constitutionality. For example, based on 
legislative history and other contextual clues, a court reasona-
bly may conclude that a legislature would prefer to persist in 
shortening an early voting period, even if the individual plain-
tiffs in a case must be given extra time to vote. A legislature 
might likewise prefer to retain a voter identification require-
ment, even if certain plaintiffs must be permitted to vote with-
out such identification. Or a legislature might wish to maintain 
political contribution limits, even if a lower court has deemed 
them invalid and held that they cannot be enforced against a 
particular plaintiff. 
Thus, if the challenged provision can coherently be applied 
to everyone other than the plaintiffs, and the court determines 
that the entity that enacted the provision would have wanted 
to “save” as much of it as possible, then a Plaintiff-Oriented 
Injunction would be the proper remedy. If, in contrast, the 
court determines that the entity that enacted the legal provision 
would not have wanted to have two conflicting sets of rules 
simultaneously enforced on different segments of the public, or 
that it would be impossible as a practical matter to apply dif-
ferent rules to different people, then a Defendant-Oriented In-
junction would be required. 
It might be objected, of course, that if the court determines 
that the provision is severable and issues only a Plaintiff-Ori-
ented Injunction, then it is allowing the government defendant 
to continue enforcing a purportedly invalid or even unconsti-
tutional law against other members of the public. It would be 
severing an invalid application of the legal provision from oth-
er invalid applications, rather than from admittedly valid ones. 
This response, though facially compelling, overlooks limits 
on the trial court’s power. A trial court has the authority to 
make legal determinations necessary to adjudicate the rights of 
the parties before it. But those rulings generally lack stare deci-
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sis or other precedential effect. In the context of litigation 
against the federal government or a state, such rulings gener-
ally cannot even give rise to non-mutual offensive collateral 
estoppel. Thus, a trial court’s decision that a legal provision is 
invalid has no legal effect beyond the immediate parties to a 
case. Any invalidation of a legal provision as it applies to third 
parties cannot be a direct or inherent consequence of the court’s 
ruling concerning its invalidity, but rather must be based on 
Equal Protection or inseverability grounds. 
B. Determining the Proper Scope of Relief at the Outset of the Case 
In cases where the framework set forth above requires a 
court to issue a Defendant-Oriented Injunction, the concerns 
identified in Part II still arise. Applying that framework at the 
outset of the case, however, would largely alleviate most of 
those concerns. In non-class cases in which the plaintiffs seek 
an injunction against a legal provision, the court could begin by 
reviewing the complaint to determine whether the claims are 
frivolous or squarely foreclosed by binding precedent,303 which 
would alleviate the need to consider the proper scope of relief. 
Assuming the complaint cannot be dismissed out of hand, the 
court should go on to apply the framework above, at the outset 
of the case, to determine whether either Equal Protection or 
severability principles would require it to issue a Defendant-
Oriented Injunction if the plaintiffs ultimately prevail. 
If the court concludes that a Defendant-Oriented Injunction 
would be the appropriate remedy, it should require the plain-
tiffs to re-file the case as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, on the 
grounds that indispensable parties—the third parties whose 
rights would be protected by the injunction—are missing.304 If, 
in contrast, the court determines that a Defendant-Oriented In-
junction would not be the proper remedy, then the case may 
proceed on a non-class basis. If the plaintiffs prevail, they 
would receive a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction. Thus, the court is 
able to ensure at the outset that, in cases where it must grant 
relief to people other than the plaintiffs, they are included as 
                                                                                                        
 303. Cf. Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 455–56 (2015). 
 304. Cf. FED R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(A) (“A person who is subject to service of process 
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must 
be joined as a party if . . . in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord com-
plete relief among existing parties . . . .”). 
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parties. This step alleviates problems arising from individual 
plaintiffs’ lack of standing to seek Defendant-Oriented Injunc-
tions, due process limitations on litigating the rights of third 
parties, and policy concerns about circumventing Rule 23’s lim-
its. This approach also prevents asymmetric claim preclusion. 
In any case where the court would have to grant relief to peo-
ple other than the individual plaintiffs, they would be included 
in the case as class members and bound by the court’s judg-
ment, whether favorable or not. 
The class could be restricted in geographic scope to limit the 
impact of the trial court’s legal rulings. At the extreme, the 
class could be limited to people living within the trial court’s 
geographic jurisdiction. For a federal lawsuit, that would mean 
limiting the class to rightholders within the judicial district in 
which the suit was filed. This would ensure that the court does 
not adjudicate claims of people living outside its jurisdiction 
concerning alleged rights violations outside that jurisdiction. 
A more reasonable compromise would be to define the class 
based on the geographic jurisdiction of the appellate court for 
the region in which the trial court is located.305 Because trial 
court rulings generally do not constitute binding precedent for 
stare decisis purposes, when a trial court adjudicates a case, it 
is interpreting and applying the law based primarily on deci-
sions of the Supreme Court and the intermediate appellate 
court for its region.306 If a trial court certifies a class that extends 
beyond the geographic jurisdiction of its appellate court, it is 
giving the force of law to that appellate court’s precedents out-
side of its jurisdiction, where its rulings lack stare decisis effect. 
Residents of other appellate regions, however, have an interest 
in having their rights be adjudicated by courts with personal 
jurisdiction over them, applying precedents that are legally 
binding upon them. 
Conversely, all trial judges within an appellate jurisdiction 
must apply the same body of precedents. When a trial judge 
certifies a class encompassing all rightholders within the appli-
cable appellate region, rightholders from other judicial districts 
within that region are not adversely affected, because their 
                                                                                                        
 305. Some states, of course, have intermediate appellate courts of statewide 
jurisdiction, in which case the scope of the class for a case filed in state court 
would be statewide. 
 306. State trial courts are also bound by their state supreme court. 
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claims are still being adjudicated based on the same binding 
precedents. Thus, a Rule 23(b)(2) class should encompass 
rightholders within the appellate jurisdiction in which the trial 
court sits. This approach ensures that each rightholder’s claim 
is adjudicated based on the correct body of precedent, respects 
limits on trial courts’ authority and the powers and preroga-
tives of coordinate appellate courts, and prevents the unneces-
sary multiplicity of suits that would result from limiting classes 
to the bounds of a trial court’s geographic jurisdiction. 
Putative members of Rule 23(b)(2) classes generally are not 
entitled to notice before class certification.307 When rightholders 
reasonably can be identified and the cost is not prohibitive, 
however, the court should apply a strong presumption in favor 
of requiring such notice. Notice would give interested 
rightholders an opportunity to object prior to class certification; 
seek to intervene as separate parties, represented by independ-
ent counsel; or file amicus briefs to raise additional points that 
the parties have overlooked. 
Because the ability of members of Rule 23(b)(2) classes to opt 
out is, at a minimum, severely constrained,308 the traditional 
rules of res judicata should apply much more loosely to them. 
Class members should be barred from relitigating only specific 
issues and arguments that were actually raised in the earlier 
case, rather than the full range of issues and arguments that 
could have been asserted.309 The court also should exercise care 
to ensure the adequacy of class counsel.310 Due to the classwide 
res judicata effect of an adverse ruling, if class counsel declines 
to appeal, the court should appoint alternate counsel to prevent 
the claims of class members throughout the region from being 
extinguished without full judicial consideration.  
                                                                                                        
 307. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A). 
 308. See id. Of course, if the court concludes that a Defendant-Oriented Injunc-
tion is the required remedy for the plaintiffs’ claims, whether as a matter of consti-
tutional law or a severability analysis, and the plaintiffs prevail, then even puta-
tive class members who purported to opt out still would be covered by the 
injunction. 
 309. Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“Under res judicata, a final 
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from 
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” (citing 
Cromwell v. Cty. of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1877))). 
 310. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
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Thus, by determining the need for classwide relief at the out-
set of a case, and tweaking some of the rules governing class 
actions, courts can position themselves to grant appropriate 
injunctive relief when plaintiffs prevail while minimizing con-
stitutional and fairness-related problems. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While both courts and academics have spent a substantial 
amount of time discussing the distinction between facial and 
as-applied challenges to legal provisions, they have generally 
overlooked the jurisdictional, constitutional, policy-based, and 
other limits on a court’s ability to enjoin invalid provisions. In 
particular, very little attention has been paid to the question of 
whether courts should issue Plaintiff- or Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions in non-class cases. Courts have applied a variety of 
inconsistent approaches, often without recognizing the numer-
ous important considerations in play. 
A trial court generally should issue a Plaintiff-Oriented In-
junction against an invalid legal provision unless it determines 
that either Equal Protection or traditional severability princi-
ples would not permit it to enjoin application of the provision 
solely against the individual plaintiffs. The court should con-
duct this analysis at the outset of the case, so that if it deter-
mines that a Defendant-Oriented Injunction would be the 
proper remedy, it can require that the case be brought as a Rule 
23(b)(2) class action. The geographic scope of the class should 
be limited to the boundaries of the appellate jurisdiction in 
which the trial court is located. Res judicata principles should 
be applied loosely to allow class members to bring subsequent 
challenges based on issues and arguments that were not actu-
ally litigated in the original case. Such an approach to injunc-
tive relief would lead to results that are more predictable and 
consistent, better reasoned, and fairer. It appropriately balances 
the duty of courts to resolve only the immediate disputes be-
fore them with their responsibility to articulate and enforce 
public values. 
 
